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Essay

An Observation and a Strange but
True 'Tale": What Might the
Historical Trials of Animals Tell Us
About the Transformative Potential of
Law in American Culture?
by
PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN*
As the title indicates, this Essay is based on an observation and a
strange but true tale. The observation, which will probably strike
many people as uncontroversial-perhaps even cliched-is that law
and legal procedures are at the core of American self-identity and are
woven deeply into the fabric of our culture. This is not a new insight.
Indeed, de Tocqueville's famous observation that "[s]carcely any
political question arises in the United States that is not resolved,

* Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. Earlier versions of
this article were presented at the annual conference of the Working Group on Law,
Culture, and the Humanities at Wake Forest School of Law, a conference on Philosophy,
Interpretation, and Culture at the State University of New York at Binghamton, the
annual meeting of the Law & Society Association, and a Law and Culture Reading Group
meeting convened by Austin Sarat at Amherst College. I am grateful to commentators at
all four gatherings for the helpful criticisms I received. I also have benefited greatly from
the useful comments and suggestions of Robert W. Gordon, John Owens, Susan S. Silbey,
Christopher Stone, Silvija A. Strikis, and my colleagues Tom Baker, Anne Dailey, Laura
A. Dickinson, and Carol Weisbrod. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the students at the
University of Connecticut School of Law who participated in my seminar on Law, Culture,
and Community in the spring of 2000, where many of the ideas presented here were
refined. Of these students, the contributions of Joy McConnell deserve special mention.
Thanks also to Courtney Lane and Elizabeth Latif for providing helpful research
assistance.
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sooner or later, into a judicial question" 1 has been repeated so often
that it has itself become a part of our national lore. Throughout the
twentieth century, de Tocqueville's observation remained accurate.
From the Scopes monkey trial to the trial of O.J. Simpson, from the
national debate over abortion to the more recent clashes over doctorassisted suicide, from the success of novelist John Grisham to the
explosion of law shows on television, we can easily see that our
national obsession with law continues unabated. And, even though
lawyers are often objects of derision, when the chips are down, we
Americans are apt to frame our struggles in the language of
competing rights and to fight our battles in a legal forum. Perhaps
Thomas Paine sealed our legalistic fate over 200 years ago when he
2
decreed that, in America, law would be king.
In recent years, some commentators have been critical of what
might be called America's abiding legal faith. Self-proclaimed
"communitarian" writers such as Mary Ann Glendon and Amitai
Etzioni, as well as others, 3 have warned that our insistence on legal
solutions is causing "the death of common sense," and encouraging us
to become a society of litigants whose insistence on "rights talk" and
litigation is thwarting our ability to reach consensus on social issues or
instill shared values in our communities. In these scenarios, our legal
our faith in
faith has improperly supplanted other values:
neighborliness, for example, or our belief in a unified American
polity, our responsibilities to each other, or our willingness to solve
problems through mutual understanding and compromise. We are
told that, somehow, law is one of the culprits, perhaps the primary
culprit, in the "disuniting of America."
There are two principal arguments that have been made in
response to such criticisms. First, some contend that the premises
underlying the criticisms are wrong. According to this view, it is a
nostalgic fantasy to believe the United States ever consisted of a
unified polity with shared values, and any effort to assert such values
will merely impose a repressive and hierarchical vision of America on

1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed.,

Henry Reeve trans.,Vintage Classics 1990) (1835).
2. THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, reprinted in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF

THOMAS PAINE 1, 29 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1969) (1945).

3. I have deliberately chosen critics writing for a popular audience because I intend
this Essay to be a response to criticisms of law that appear to have considerable purchase
within the public at large. I recognize, of course, that there exist a great number of other,
more philosophical, critiques of the liberal legal tradition that are considerably more
complex than the broadsides I discuss here.
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those with less political power. Second, it has been argued that, even
though assertions of individual legal entitlements might sometimes
trump majoritarian concerns, such results can nevertheless be
justified on other grounds, perhaps as a matter of moral or political
theory.
Both of these responses may well have merit. However, I believe

they are insufficient because they resolutely refuse to respond to
those Americans who (whether correctly or not) experience our
culture as increasingly fragmented, long for a sense of community
consensus, and believe that legalistic thinking has been an integral
part of our cultural dissolution. For those people, it will not do to say
the perception is a nostalgic fantasy, and it may also be inadequate to
insist that the various justifications outweigh the drawbacks to the
community. Thus, I wish to propose another possible avenue of
inquiry, which addresses more directly the concerns about our
legalistic culture. My questions are: Instead of being seen as a
necessary evil, can law4 actually help us to heal rifts in our social
4. When I refer to "law" in this essay, I mean something very broad indeed. Not only
do I refer to formal legal rules and procedures, but also to "quasi-legal" discourses and
practices that sometimes straddle the law/entertainment boundary. See, e.g., Austin Sarat,
Imagining the Law of the Father: Loss, Dread,and Mourning in the Sweet Hereafter, 34
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 3, 5-10 (2000) (arguing that sociolegal scholars must "take on"
cultural studies by considering how law exists in a world of film and television images);
Alison Young, Murder in the Eyes of the Law, 17 STuD. L. POL. & SOc'Y 31, 31 (1997)
(exploring how law "appears and reappears in the cinematic text"); see generally Richard
Sherwin, PicturingJustice: Images of Law and Lawyers in the Visual Media, 30 U.S.F. L.
REV. 891 (1996). These include television court channels, legal talk shows, legal "thriller"
novels and films, public memorials and ceremonies (such as the monument to victims of
the Oklahoma City bombing or candlelight vigils to build community after hate crimes),
and marches on Washington (such as the "Million Mom March" to lobby for stricter
handgun regulations). Even more broadly, my invocation of law is meant to refer to the
often unnoticed practice of "law talk" in the society at large. By law talk, I mean the use
of legal concepts in everyday language. Such talk includes abstract (and often inchoate)
ideas of street justice, due process, civil disobedience, retribution, deterrence, and rights,
all of which are frequently invoked both in public discussions and dinner-table
conversations alike. Indeed, I deliberately use a conception of law aimed at expanding the
law's generic constraints to encompass a broader spectrum of discourses talking in the
"shadow" of official legal categories, but talking law nonetheless.
Over the past two decades, sociolegal scholars have increasingly embraced such a
broad conception of "law." They have taken seriously Clifford Geertz' observation that
law is not simply an instrument for enforcing a system of morality or justice but is also
"part of a distinctive manner of imagining the real." CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local
Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FuRTHER ESSAYS iN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 184, (1983). Accordingly,
scholars have emphasized that law cannot be distinguished from the rest of social life;
rather, "law permeates social life, and its influence is not adequately grasped by treating
law as a type of external, normative influence on independent, ongoing activities." Bryant
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fabric by creating a forum for useful discussion and debate among
differing worldviews? And can this be done without simply imposing
a hierarchical social order? In other words, if law is a constitutive
part of who we are as Americans, can we see how this heritage might
actually be used to draw us together as a people rather than divide
us? And how might we begin to think creatively about this
transformative potential?
Which brings me to the tale. In 1522, in the district of Autun,
France, a group of villagers discovered that its barley crops had been
eaten by rats. 5 The townspeople took the matter to the ecclesiastical
courts, which duly investigated the "crime" and then delivered a
summons to the rats, ordering them to stand trial. A court official

G. Garth & Austin Sarat, Justice and Power in Law and Society Research: On the
Contested Careers of Core Concepts, in JUSTICE AND POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES 1,
3 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds. 1998). As Paul Kahn has written recently, "We
experience the rule of law not just when the policeman stops us on the street or when we
consult a lawyer on how to create a corporation. The rule of law shapes our experience of
meaning everywhere and at all times. It is not alone in shaping meaning, but it is rarely
absent." PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 124 (1999); see also PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON
PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 20 (1998) ("Legality... operates
through social life as persons and groups deliberately interpret and invoke law's language,
authority, and procedures to organize their lives and manage their relationships. In short.
the commonplace operation of law in daily life makes us all legal agents insofar as we
actively make law, even when no formal legal agent is involved.").
The great variety of discourses that might be brought under the rubric of "law talk"
not only attests to the conceptual power of law in the collective American consciousness.
but also simultaneously underscores the elusiveness of the very concept of "law." For
example, even relatively well-established forms of "alternative" dispute resolution, such as
mediation and arbitration, are accepted by many legal practitioners as legitimate quasilegal mechanisms; to others, however, they are viewed as antithetical, even subversive, to
canonical law practice. This is merely one example of the way in which a narrow
definition of "law" can serve as a hegemonic arbiter of what counts as sanctioned legal
practice. Thus, a methodical definition of "law" is not only likely to be unsatisfying, but it
also may tend to privilege certain understandings of law over others. In any event,
attempting such a definition is a project far beyond the scope of this Essay. Accordingly,
although I refer to "law" and "legal" discourse liberally, I do so with invisible quotation
marks around them in order to acknowledge their broad interpretation and application.
Cf EWICK & SILBEY, supra, at 22 (choosing to use the term "legality" rather than "law"
to describe a broader set of "meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices that are
commonly recognized as legal, regardless of who employs them or for what ends").
5. For accounts of this trial, see ESTHER COHEN, THE CROSSROADS OF JUSTICE 12021 (1993) [hereinafter COHEN, CROSSROADS]; E.P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS 18-19 (1906). Esther Cohen.
Law, Folklore and Animal Lore, 110 PAST & PRESENT 6, 14 (1986) [hereinafter Cohen.
Folklore]; Walter Woodburn Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals and
Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modern Times, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 696,706 (1916).
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believed to
went to an area of the countryside where the rats were
6
live, and served notice in a loud and solemn declaration.
This seemingly bizarre case then proceeded to an actual trial.
The court appointed an advocate to defend the rats, a young lawyer
named Bartolom6e Chassen6e. When the defendants failed to appear
in court in response to the summons, Chassen6e intervened to save
his clients from a default judgment. He argued that there had not
been proper service of process because in fact "the salvation or ruin
of all rats was at stake" in the case, and so all rats (and not just those
in the village with the crops) deserved to be informed. 7 At his
demand, the priests of each and every parish within the diocese of
Autun announced a new summons. When the rats once more failed
to appear, Chassen6e urged that, because the rats were dispersed
across the countryside, more time was needed for them to make the
migration to the courthouse. 8 Having been granted another delay,
Chassen6e pressed his case for the still-absent rats: he argued that a
summons implied the full protection of the law on the way to the
courthouse, but that his clients, though anxious to appear, were in
fear for their lives from hostile cats and could not be expected to risk
death in order to obey the summons. 9
Strange as it may sound, this "tale" is not really a tale at all, for
the trial described above actually took place. Moreover, it was not a
unique occurrence. Records indicate that trials of animals took place
throughout Europe and elsewhere from the ninth through the
nineteenth centuries. 10 Individual animals were tried (usually for
killing human beings) in secular courts according to common law
precedents dating back to the Book of Exodus.1 And, as with the
rats of Autun, many animals were tried in groups as public nuisances
before ecclesiastical tribunals.'2
6. Hyde, supra note 5, at 704.
7. Statement of Bartolom6e Chassen~e, as quoted in The Crossroads of Justice.
COHEN, CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 121 (citing AUGUSTE DE THOU, 1 HISTOIRE

UNIVERSELLE DEPUIS 1593 JUSQU'EN 1607, at 414-16 (1734)); see also EVANS, supra note
5, at 19; Hyde, supranote 5, at 706.
8. COHEN, CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 121; EvANS, supra note 5, at 19; Hyde,

supranote 5, at 706.
9. COHEN, CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 121; EVANS, supra note 5, at 19; Hyde,
supra note 5, at 706-07.
10. See EvANS, supra note 5, at 265-86.
11. See JJ. Finkelstein, The Ox That Gored,71 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. SOC'Y. (pt.
2) 5, 48-73 (1981) (linking the animal trials to the Biblical story of the ox that is
slaughtered for having killed a man). See generally Exodus 21:28-32.
12. See COHEN, CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 110. But see Finkelstein, supra note

11, at 64-66. Finkelstein argues that the ecclesiastical trials can be dismissed because they
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I have written previously about these trials and about similar

legal proceedings in medieval England

and ancient

Greece

13
condemning inanimate objects that caused harm to human beings.
But in this Essay I wish to connect these historical trials to the
observation about America's legalistic culture I have already
mentioned. Precisely because it is difficult for us to see any rational
point to conducting a trial of a rat or a pig, these trials allow us to
speculate about possible social functions 14 that trials (and legal
discourse more generally) may fulfill for a community. These social
functions may extend far beyond the usual justifications for law and
legal proceedings-for example, the need to punish wrongdoers or
discover the truth about an event, or the desire to create proper
incentives or provide monetary compensation. As one commentator
has noted, the trial of an animal "was not a game. It was undertaken
for the good of society, and if properly conducted it was intended to
bring social benefits to the community-benefits, that is, to human
beings." 15 Can we identify possible social benefits the trials brought
to the people of these towns? If so, how might these benefits permit
us to think creatively about the potential value of legal discourse as a
language for debating community dilemmas?
In his seminal essay, Nomos and Narrative, Robert Cover argued
that law functions in part as "a system of tension or a bridge linking a
concept of a reality to an imagined alternative. ' ' 16 In this view, law is

"were not proper trials, but were ritual procedures." Id. at 65. His distinction is arbitrary
and certainly not grounded in the medieval experience, which seems to have viewed both
secular and ecclesiastical proceedings as serious judicial events. In any event, this Essay
will argue that trials are in fact ritual forms, so his distinction is particularly unhelpful in
the context of this analysis.
13. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, An Anthropological Approach to Modern
Forfeiture Law: The Symbolic Function of Legal Actions Against Objects, 11 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Berman, Forfeiture];Paul Schiff Berman, Note, Rats, Pigs,
and Statues on Trial: The Creation of Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals
and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 288 (1994) [hereinafter Berman, Narratives].
14. Although this Essay discusses the possible social functions of these trials, I
recognize that a discussion of social function by itself cannot explain why the trials
occurred. Critics have often attacked functionalist arguments for implying such a causal
link. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY 32 (1979) ("A large body of sociological literature seems to rest upon an
implicit regulative idea that if you can demonstrate that a given pattern has unintended.
unrecognized and beneficial effects, then you have also explained why it exists and
persists."). My aim, instead, is merely to identify possible social functions so as to
generate creative thought about the various roles legal language and procedures might
fulfill for a society.
15. Nicholas Humphrey, Introduction,in EVANS, supra note 5, at xx.
16. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, The Supreme Court 1982
Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1983).
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a language that allows us to discuss, imagine, and ultimately even
perhaps generate alternative worlds spun from present reality. Thus,
'17
Cover envisioned law as that which connects "reality" to "alternity.'
If Cover's vision is correct, then law has enormous potential as a
creative and transformative language. Building on this vision, my
goal is to see whether one can use the idea of law as generative
discourse to develop a response to those who view the prevalence of
"law talk" as inherently destructive of community. I choose the
animal trials as my case study for this inquiry not because I believe
they represent legal practices we should seek to emulate. Rather, the
very unfamiliarity and seeming irrationality of the practice forces us
into what I believe is a useful thought experiment; if we can imagine
plausible social functions that those trials might have served, then it
might help us to identify possible social roles law might still fulfill
today.
Part I of this Essay sketches the contours of what I will call
America's abiding legal faith. I also survey the arguments of some
contemporary writers who decry our "legalistic" way of parsing the
world, and then I consider possible responses to this critique. Part II
outlines the history of animal trials and describes how these trials may
have served as fora for societal debates among conflicting narratives
for describing the relationship between human beings, animals, and
the "natural" world. Part III speculates that legal proceedings, even
in contemporary America, may bring social benefits that are often
overlooked. Drawing from anthropologist Victor Turner's theory of
"social dramas," I ask whether we can conceive of a role for law that
is generative rather than destructive. As a starting point for such a
discussion, I offer for consideration three potential social functions
for legal discourse, all based on insights gleaned from the animal trials
discussed in Part II. First, the mere assertion of legal jurisdiction
may, in and of itself, help to define the boundaries of membership in
the community. Accordingly, even if a community condemns a
transgressor, the very use of legal mechanisms nevertheless confirms
that the individual is, in fact, a member of that community. Second,
law provides a rationalizing framework and a formal discourse that
encourages a dialogue built on appeals to broader philosophical and
legal principles. In addition, the ritualized18 nature of legal discourse
17. ROBERT M. COVER, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in
NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 173, 176
(Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992) (citing G. STEINER, AFTER BABEL 222 (1975)).
18. The term "ritual" will be used throughout this Essay to mean a formal, socially
standardized, and repetitive action wrapped in a web of symbolism that serves to channel
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may itself be a source of comfort in times of traumatic stress. Third,

and perhaps most importantly, legal and quasi-legal discourse,
particularly when it is widely dispersed within a culture, may provide
a useful language for both debating and contesting social and political

issues and for adjudicating among the multiple narratives 19 that are
emotion, define experience, and guide understanding. This relatively broad definition
follows the conceptual understanding employed by most contemporary anthropologists.
Until a generation ago, the term ritual was more often used only to describe supernatural
or religious rites. This definition stemmed from Emile Durkheim's influential statement
that rituals are "rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the
presence of... sacred objects." EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF
RELIGIOUS LIFE 56 (Joseph W. Swain trans., London, G. Allen & Unwin 1915) (1912).
Fundamental to Durkheim's belief was that rituals were coercive moral forces dictating
right behavior and that they were connected to organized religion. Contemporary cultural
scholars have broadened the focus somewhat by studying how all members in a culture use
the narratives produced by various social institutions to construct meaning. Thus, ritual is
seen as "an analytic category that helps us deal with the chaos of human experience and
put it in a coherent framework." DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND POWER 8
(1988); see generally id. at 1-14.
19. I use the word "narrative" in a broad sense to describe any type of explanatory
framework for describing reality. Over the past several decades, anthropologists, literary
critics and legal scholars have increasingly studied the role of narratives in structuring our
experience of the world. See generally VINCENT CRAPANZANO, TUHAMI: PORTRAIT OF
A MOROCCAN (1980) (exploring conflicting storytelling styles between anthropologist and
subject); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans..
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1974) (1967) (drawing on the work of linguist Ferdinand de
Saussure to argue that language provides no direct access to reality and therefore what we
call "reality" is really a set of narrative conventions); RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND
TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1989) (advocating that social science
acknowledge the role of conflicting narratives and subjectivity in descriptions of reality):
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF EXPERIENCE (Victor W. Turner & Edward M. Bruner eds.,
1986) (collecting essays exploring the relationship between experience and narratives used
to describe experience); Roland Barthes, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of
Narratives, in IMAGE -MusIC- TEXT 79 (Stephen Heath trans., Noonday Press 1977)
(1967) (using linguistics to construct, describe, and classify a theory of narratives); Peter
Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW'S STORIES 14, 14 (Peter Brooks &
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) ("Narrative appears to be one of our large, all-pervasive ways of
organizing and speaking the world-the way we make sense of meanings that unfold in
and through time."); Cover, supra note 16, at 4 (arguing that "[nlo set of legal institutions
or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning");
Claude _,vi-Strauss, The Effectiveness of Symbols, in STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
186, 197-201 (Claire Jacobson & Brooke Grundfest Schoepf trans., Basic Books 1963)
(1958) (describing the use of narratives to encapsulate pain); Hayden White, The Value of
Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in ON NARRATIVE 1, 2 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed..
1981) (finding that "[n]arrative is a metacode, a human universal on the basis of which
transcultural messages about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted").
Narratives are now seen as encompassing almost any form of social discourse and not just
traditional narrative forms, such as folktales. See, e.g., Barthes, supra, at 79 ("The
narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious
variety of genres.... [U]nder this almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is present in
every age, in every place, in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind and
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inevitably present in a heterogeneous society. Thus, law may function
as a symbolic terrain of engagement for competing worldviews. In
this vision, our supposed national tendency to wage legal battles may
not be a sign of true divisiveness, but rather of the constructive need
for a discursive forum to tell alternative stories.
If law can actually play such a generative role as a site for
discourse, then perhaps our nation's abiding legal faith is not solely
the albatross we have been led to believe it is. Perhaps our faith is
also an opportunity. By creating both a forum and a language for
conversation among diverse cultural narratives, and by establishing a
commitment to a culture of conversation about competing values,
legal debates could foster dialogue in a postmodern culture where
most historical verities have been exposed as products of hierarchy.
Such dialogue, because it includes the possibility for continuous selfcriticism and re-creation, may even open the space Cover envisions
for generating bridges to alternative realities.
This is an idealistic vision, to be sure, and I certainly do not mean
to suggest that law always, or even often, lives up to this vision. But if
we are indeed a society founded on a legal faith, then perhaps instead
of railing against that heritage we should attempt to construct a more
productive narrative about law's transformative potential. This Essay
is an attempt to begin that process. Thus, what I offer is not proof
that law is transformative, but only speculation and hope that it could
be. This speculation and hope constitutes my own legal faith.
Before continuing, three caveats are in order. First, I do not
attempt in this Essay a thorough historical analysis of the animal
trials. No doubt these trials meant different things to peoples of
different cultures and eras, and I do not presume to say that these
meanings were the same throughout history or that legal proceedings
today necessarily carry the same meanings as they did in the past.
Rather, I assert only that these trials possessed some cultural meaning
for the communities in which they took place and that we should be
aware of law as a form of cultural story-telling. Moreover, for my
purposes the usefulness of the animal trials lies not so much in trying
to divine the historical causes or significance of the practice, but in
employing the trials to stimulate imaginative thinking about the
possible cultural roles of law more generally.
there nowhere is nor has been a people without narrative."). The focus on narratives
allows critics to study how the vessel by which we impart social knowledgeconversational forms, gestures, news items-itself constitutes our apprehension of reality.
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Second, this Essay is intended to stimulate creative discussion,
not to provide policy prescriptions. While a great number of
normative ramifications may flow from the ideas I present, any
specific proposal would require us to balance the possible
community-building benefit against the various other values that may
be implicated. My goal is only to encourage us to think broadly about
law's potential.
Finally, although this Essay responds to those who worry that we
are losing a sense of cultural unity or shared values, it is important to
emphasize that the vision of law I propose is not aimed at actually
trying to create a consensus about particular cultural values. Indeed,
pursuing such a project strikes me as more likely to create resentment
among those whose values are inevitably suppressed, thereby leading
to long-term simmering dissension rather than harmony. Instead, I
argue that law can benefit society by providing a useful site for the
play of cultural discourses and the encounter with the Other. As I
will discuss in Part III, I believe such a forum for public discourse can,
in and of itself, help to unify society-even though it does not impose
a single set of values-because it encourages us to acknowledge the
legitimacy of the multiple points-of-view that exist on any given issue.
As a result, "law talk" in the United States, including informal legal
and quasi-legal discourse 2°1 that takes place outside of official legal
institutions, may be an essential part of creating and perpetuating
what political scientists refer to as "civil society." 2' Thus, to whatever
extent we perceive the erosion of civil society or feel the need for
cultural unity,22 I believe our legal faith may still be part of the
solution and not just part of the problem.

20. See supra note 4.
21. It is not completely clear what writers actually mean by the term "civil society,"
see, e.g., Alan Ryan, My Way, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 10, 2000, at 47 ("By 'civil
society,' writers have meant something not very precise but intuitively plausible."), but I
take a civil society generally to be one where the citizenry teach each other, through both
formal and informal mechanisms, the behaviors necessary to make communities work
effectively.
22. For example, Robert Putnam has recently argued that the dissolution of American
civil society and the slow erosion of American "social capital" in the past three decades is
cause for serious concern. See generally, ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). "For the first two-thirds
of the twentieth century a powerful tide bore Americans into ever deeper engagement in
the life of their communities, but a few decades ago-silently, without warning-that tide
reversed and.., we have been pulled apart from one another and from our
communities...." Id. at 27. Putnam links the rise in demand for lawyers since 1970 to
declines in social capital, suggesting that we turned increasingly to "preventive lawyering"
when "informal understandings no longer seemed adequate or prudent." Id. at 147.
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I. The Observation: America's Legal Faith and Its
Discontents
A.

Survey of Our Historical Legal Faith

There is probably no real way to demonstrate conclusively that
law is a constitutive part of American self-identity, and in this section,
I do not attempt such a demonstration, nor do I provide a systematic
or empirical study of American attitudes about law. Instead, I offer
only an impressionistic account of law's continued claim on the
American psyche.23 For better or worse, law has always maintained a
privileged place in our national discourse.2 4 We have mythologized
law, we have followed the great trials and legal debates of each
successive era, and we have remained fascinated by the workings of
our legal system as reflected both in the courts and in the popular
culture.
This national discourse about law was evident as early as the
nation's founding. As Robert Ferguson has observed, "[tihe
centrality of law in the birth of the republic is a matter of national
Perhaps most famously, Thomas Paine, in Common Sense,
lore."'
suggested that, in order to fill the gap left by overthrowing the
monarch, the American people could draft a legal charter, place it on
top of the Bible, and then place a crown on the charter, declaring to
all the world "that in America the law is king. '26 Indeed, the
revolutionary crisis of 1763-76 may even be seen as "the dramatic,
ironic final act" 27 in a "litigation explosion" 28 that was already
prevalent in colonial America. As one historian has pointed out,
"[flaw went everywhere in our early legal history.... Throughout
While this correlation may be accurate, Putnam does not address the possibility that legal
and quasi-legal discourse could actually help generate social capital. This Essay attempts
to articulate such a possibility.
23. This account owes much to the discussion in David Ray Papke, The American
Legal Faith: Traditions, Contradictionsand Possibilities,30 IND. L. REv. 645 (1997). See
also generally JOHN E. SEMONCHE, KEEPING THE FAITH: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1998).
24. Some commentators have criticized this discourse, arguing that elites have
historically encouraged the veneration of law as a way to retain their power while offering
the illusion of justice to those who might otherwise rebel. A discussion of this critique is
beyond the scope of this Essay. Regardless of how our legal faith arose, I argue only that
such a faith remains a part of our culture and that we should explore the transformative
potential of this faith.
25. ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETrERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 11 (1984).

26. PAINE, supra note 2, at 29.
27. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 97 (1992).

28. Id. at 96.
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their colonial and revolutionary experience, Americans developed a
passion for law, a legalism that pervaded social, economic, religious,
and political relationships. They laid their disputes with one another
29
before the courts of law to an extent exceeding all other peoples."
As the nation grew, the idea of law "assumed a vital role as the
integral constituting element of a society that had come into being
over the previous seventy-odd years. '30 Schoolbooks routinely spoke
of the Constitution as divinely inspired and glorious. 31 Prominent
figures such as Daniel Webster referred to the Constitution as
"complete and perfect ' 32 and observed that it was "the basis of our
identity, the cement of our Union, and the source of our national
prosperity and renown. '33 Political scientist Sanford Levinson has
noted that the Constitution has often been analogized34 to a sacred text
in order to emphasize national unity and integration.
While the Constitution can thus be seen as an icon that
symbolized the American legal faith, the courtroom trial has been
possibly the most important ritual of that faith.3 5 In rural areas, the
arrival of a judge riding circuit was a major event, and trials became36
the primary manifestation of government in these communities.
The trials were so popular, in fact, that one treatise-writer of the era
observed: "The cabinet maker is known in his town; a good physician
for 100 miles; a lawyer throughout America. '37 The legal proceedings
were also widely publicized. Periodicals of the era published special
trial reports, 38 and the new daily penny press of the 1830s and 1840s
treated trial reporting as one of their principal beats. 39 "Readers,
many of whom were first-generation literate, could find in the trial
29. Id. at ix-x.
30. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR,
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 26 (1993).

AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY

31. Papke, supra note 23, at 650.
32. Brooks D. Simpson, Daniel Webster and the Cult of the Constitution, 15 J. AM.
CULTURE 15, 17 (1992).
33. Id. at 16.
34. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 17 (1988).
35. Papke, supra note 23, at 651 ("Like rituals in a conventional faith, the trial
provided reassurance that there was a community of believers.").
36. See FERGUSON, supra note 25, at 69-70.
37. JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF REVOLUTIONARY
AMERICA 200 (1965) (quoting Letter from St. George Tucker to Masters Theodorick and
John Randolph (June 12, 1787), in ST. GEORGE TUCKER PAPERS, COLONIAL
WILLIAMSBURG).
38. See DANIEL A. COHEN, PILLARS OF SALT, MONUMENTS OF GRACE: NEW
ENGLAND CRIME LITERATURE AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE.

1674-1860, at 26-31 (1993).
39. Papke, supra note 23, at 651.
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reports a forum for denouement, a locus for resolution of social
'40
problems, and an expression of community norms.
American political and scholarly rhetoric continued to emphasize
the importance of law. For example, Abraham Lincoln, echoing
Thomas Paine, went so far as to propose that Americans swear an
oath to revere the law:
Let reverence for the laws be breathed by every American mother
to the lisping babe that prattles on her lap; let it be taught in
schools, in seminaries, and in colleges; let it be written in primers,
spelling-books, and in almanacs; let it be preached from the pulpit,
proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts of justice.
And, in short, let it become the political religion of the nation .... 41
Likewise, de Tocqueville's writings on the importance of law in
American culture, 42 whether or not accurate as a descriptive matter,
undoubtedly contributed to the mythologizing of law in the national
discourse.
The pervasive presence of law in American society grew still
greater in the twentieth century, penetrating even more spheres of
social and domestic life.43 The century saw the enfranchisement of
women and the enforcement of civil rights protections for African
Americans. In addition, we witnessed the establishment of public
defenders offices to represent criminal defendants, the expansion of
the Bill of Rights to cover a range of police procedures and prison
conditions, and the creation of an income tax law, bank deposit
insurance laws, social security laws, and regulatory laws aimed at
everything from environmental protection to the filing of corporate
financial statements. Government agencies dispatched agents around
the country to enforce legal rights and duties. Litigation among

40. Id.
41. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield,
Illinois, in 1 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 35, 43 (John G. Nicolay & John
Hay eds., 1894).
42 See, e.g., 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 280 ("The language of the law thus
becomes, in some measure, a vulgar tongue; the spirit of the law, which is produced in the
schools and courts of justice, gradually penetrates beyond their walls into the bosom of
society, where it descends to the lowest classes, so that at last the whole people contract
the habits and the tastes of the judicial magistrate.").
43. The examples in this paragraph are drawn from a useful discussion of law in
twentieth-century America found in Robert Kagan et al., Facilitatingand Domesticating
Change: Democracy, Capitalism, and Law's Double Role in the Twentieth Century, in
LOOKING BACK AT LAw's CENTURY (Kagan et al. eds., forthcoming 2001) (on file with
author).
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business corporations grew rapidly, 44 and the size of law firms serving
corporate clients increased as well. 45 By the end of the twentieth
century, the threat of legal liability permeated the operation of
universities, public school systems, hospitals, and municipal
governments, as well as tobacco companies, land developers, and
product manufacturers.
Perhaps most significantly, ordinary
individuals increasingly came to think of themselves as possessing
legal rights and therefore defined "the law" not only as a range of
official demands and constraints, but as a universally available set of
46
entitlements.
Popular trials continued in the twentieth century to function as
flashpoints for larger cultural battles. "Scopes, Sacco-Vanzetti, the
Rosenbergs, the Chicago Seven-these names have come to
represent bitter conflicts and dramatic moments in our social
history." 47 More recently, trials of O.J. Simpson, Louise Woodward,
Jack Kevorkian, and the officers who arrested Rodney King
crystalized great societal debates about contested issues that extended
far beyond the trials themselves. Indeed, most of our great societal
dilemmas continue to be played out in legal fora. Thus, debates
about abortion and euthanasia, affirmative action, the role of religion
in civic life, the efficacy of school vouchers, the need to save the
environment, and the strength and extent of individual property
rights all have been aired principally in a legal context. And,
whatever one might think about the role of the courts in the
presidential election of 2000, there can be little doubt that the postelection contest is a testament to the extraordinary willingness of
Americans to wage political battles in a legal forum.
Law continues to occupy a prominent position in our popular
culture as well. In 1989, the Yale Law Journal devoted an entire
symposium issue to "Popular Legal Culture, '48 largely inspired by the
success of the television series "L.A. Law ' 49 and the novel The
Bonfire of the Vanities.50 Since that time, law has become an even
44. See, e.g., William Nelson, Contract Litigation and the Elite Bar in New York City,
1960-1980,39 EMORY L.J. 413 (1990).
45. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:
THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE BIG LAW FIRMS (1991).
46. See generally EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 4.

47. Robert Hariman, Performing the Laws: Popular Trials and Social Knowledge, in
POPULAR TRIALS:

RHETORIC, MASS MEDIA, AND THE LAW 1, 1 (Robert Hariman ed.,

1990).
48. Symposium, PopularLegal Culture,98 YALE L.J. 1545 (1989).
49. L.A. Law (NBC television series).
50. TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1988).
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more ubiquitous presence in our popular culture, with four primetime television series devoted to lawyers, 51 both fiction and nonfiction bestsellers on legal themes, 52 and a slew of movies revolving
around law and lawyers. 53 A quick scan of daytime television reveals
no fewer than three television shows in which celebrity judges resolve
actual cases 4 -and that's not even counting the 24-hour law coverage
on the Courtroom Television network. As Richard K. Sherwin has
recently argued, we are increasingly seeing not just an intermingling

of law and popular culture, but an erosion of the line between the
two. 55

B. The Critics
In recent years, a number of writers have both acknowledged
and criticized our national tendency to use law as a mechanism for
addressing social issues. These commentators have argued that our
reliance on legal solutions undermines our sense of community,
fosters an adversarial and contentious culture, limits our ability to
forge consensus solutions, and fragments the populace. Together,
such criticisms pose a significant challenge to those who would defend
our abiding legal faith.
These "anti-law" arguments tend to focus on three aspects of our
legal system: the invocation of legal "rights," the reliance on legal
regulations, and the tendency to pursue litigation to solve problems. I
will briefly discuss each of these criticisms.
(1)

Critiqueof a Discourseof Rights

At the beginning of the 1990s, Mary Ann Glendon and Amitai
Etzioni issued popular broadsides against what they called the
51. See, e.g., Ally McBeal (FOX television series); JAG (CBS television series); Law
and Order(NBC television series); The Practice(ABC television series).
52. See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE STREET LAWYER (1998); DAVID GUTERSON,
SNOW FALLING ON CEDARS (1995); JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995);
RICHARD

NORTH PATTERSON, THE FINAL JUDGMENT

(1995); SCOTT TUROW,

PERSONAL INJURIES (1999).
53. See, e.g., THE RAINMAKER (Paramount Pictures 1997); A CIVIL ACTION
(Touchstone Pictures 1999); THE PELICAN BRIEF (Warner Brothers Studios 1993); THE
CLIENT; A TIME TO KILL (Warner Brothers Studios 1995); MURDER IN THE FIRST
(Warner Brothers Studios 1995); PRIMAL FEAR (Paramount Pictures 1996) ; GUILTY AS
SIN (Buena Vista International 1993); THE ACCUSED (Paramount Pictures 1988); ERIN
BROCKOVICH (Paramount Pictures 2000).
54. See, e.g., Judge Joe Brown (CBS television show); Judge Judy (CBS television
show); The People'sCourt (NBC television show).
55. See generally RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING
LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE (2000).
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discourse of rights in American society. They argued that the
national focus on individual entitlements deflects attention from
collective responsibilities and encourages intractable arguments based
on absolutes. As Glendon put it, "[d]iscourse about rights has
become the principal language that we use in public settings to discuss
weighty questions of right and wrong, but time and again it proves
inadequate, or leads to a standoff of one right against another. '56 In a
similar vein Etzioni contended that, by re-casting a privilege (such as
higher education) as a right or entitlement, we fail to consider
seriously the difficult policy questions regarding how to pay for
57
education and how best to use collective resources.
Both Glendon and Etzioni argue that our use of "rights talk" to
debate social issues has increased dramatically over the past forty
years. In their view this trend goes hand in hand with a more general
dissolution of American cultural values since the 1950s. Thus,
Glendon sees the resort to absolutist legal arguments about rights as a
response to "the communications problems that beset a
heterogeneous nation whose citizens decreasingly share a common
history, literature, religion, or customs." 58 Likewise, Etzioni observes
that, "[s]ince the early sixties, many of our moral traditions, social
values and institutions have been challenged. ' 59 Although he
acknowledges that these challenges often were valid attacks on
repressive and hierarchical social structures, the "end result,"
according to Etzioni, "is that we live in a state of increasing moral
'60
confusion and social anarchy.
In the face of this confusion and the breakdown of the old
unifying hierarchy, individuals and fragmented groups have insisted
that their interests be heard. However, according to Glendon and
Etzioni, because we tend to frame these interests in the legal language
of rights, we become more and more fragmented and are unable to
enter into constructive dialogue. This legal language, to Glendon,
unwisely places the needs of the self at the center of the universe,
promotes the short-run over the long term, and elevates particular
interests over the common good. 61 As a result, our political discourse
becomes "[s]aturated with rights" and "can no longer perform the
56. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:

THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL

DISCOURSE, at x (1991).
57. AMITAI ETzIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 5 (1993).
58. GLENDON, supra note 56, at xii.
59. ETZIONI, supra note 57, at 12.

60. Id.
61. GLENDON, supra note 56, at xi.
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important function of facilitating public discussion of the right
ordering of our lives together." 62
(2) Critiqueof Legal Regulations
Philip K. Howard, in his 1994 work The Death of Common Sense:
How Law is SuffocatingAmerica,63 also criticizes our cultural reliance
on legal solutions, but he focuses on the use of statutes and
regulations to try to control human behavior. According to Howard,
the breadth and detail of such regulations have expanded rapidly in
the past forty years. Thus, he observes that the "Federal Register, a
daily report of new and proposed regulations, increased from 15,000
pages in the final year of John F. Kennedy's presidency to over 70,000
pages in the last year of George H. Bush's." 64
Howard attributes this growth not merely to government's
expanded role in providing social services and protecting the public
welfare, but also to changes in our attitude towards law. He argues
that we now seek "self-executing" laws that limit human discretion as
much as possible.6 5 He characterizes the contemporary American
view as the belief that, in all matters of regulation, "law itself will
provide an answer. '66 Thus, "[s]entence by sentence, [law] prescribes
every eventuality that countless rule writers can imagine. But words,
even millions of them, are finite. One slip-up, one unforseen event,
67
and all those logical words turn into dictates of illogic."
Echoing Glendon's and Etzioni's views about the impact of
rights talk, Howard argues that regulations likewise render
meaningful debate about policy matters impossible. According to
Howard, regulations create inflexible rules that prevent people from
working together to solve problems. He concludes that Americans
feel disconnected from government in part because "rigid rules shut
out our point of view.1 68 He therefore advocates that we "step[ ] out
from law's shadows." 69 We may therefore face a degree of
uncertainty regarding the rules that govern behavior, but, to Howard,
"[c]onstant exposure to uncertainty and disagreement is critical to

6Z Id.
63. PHILIP K.

HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE:

SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994).
64. Id at 25.
65. 1&.at 51.
66. Id.
67. L
68. Id. at 173.
69. I& at 177.
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(3) Critiqueof Litigation
Finally, we turn to two recent critics who decry what they call
America's "litigation explosion," Walter K. Olson and Patrick M.
Garry. Both writers offer statistics to indicate that the number of
lawsuits filed in this country since 1960 has risen dramatically. 71 They
also point to the rising dollar value of tort judgments, and they lament
the increased expense of defending suits as well as the cumbersome
72
process of moving cases through clogged courts.
Like Glendon, Etzioni and Howard, Olson and Garry also focus
on America's over-reliance on law to address social problems. For
example, Olson warns that thinking of civil lawsuits as vessels for
"compensation" and "deterrence" is "seductive" because:
In no time at all you get to thinking of them less as a personal
tragedy and more as a policy opportunity. You begin to imagine
that the more people sue, the more will find happiness; while the
more people get sued, the more responsibly everyone will behave
for fear of sharing the same fate. The more lawsuits
there are, in
73
short, the closer to perfect the world will become.
Likewise, Garry argues that, because of "America's litigation
obsession," 74 courts "have increasingly become the forum for public
policy," whereby political interest groups can bypass the political
process entirely and "tak[e] their agendas directly to the courts. '75
These courts, in Garry's view, can then award new rights "that are
'76
safely off-limits to any future legislative action.
These critics, like those already discussed, see our reliance on
legal solutions as at least partly responsible for the increasing
fragmentation of our culture since the beginning of the 1960s. Garry
argues that the litigation explosion has realigned "American society
toward an adversarial model and away from the assimilation (or
'melting pot') model that prevailed largely up until the late 20"h
70. Id. at 178.
71. PATRICK M. GARRY, A NATION OF ADVERSARIES:
HOW THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION Is RESHAPING AMERICA 15 (1997); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 5-6 (1991).

72. GARRY, supra note 71, at 16; OLSON, supra note 71, at 1-11.

73. OLSON, supra note 71, at 4.
74. GARRY, supra note 71, at 15.
75. Id. at 7. Garry apparently has in mind recent lawsuits against tobacco companies
and gun manufacturers, as well as the attempts by antiabortion groups to file malpractice
claims against doctors who perform abortions. See id. at 95-96.
76. Id. at 95-96.
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century. ' 77 He identifies the assimilation model as one in which
"society was seen as a collection of cooperating individuals who
sacrificed their differences for the sake of social cohesion. '78 While
he recognizes that this model "often denied the inherent diversity of
American culture, 7 9 the alternative, according to Garry, is a
multicultural model where there is no meaningful way for individuals
to relate to each other. 80 The result, Garry argues, is an adversarial
culture "bred by the values and lessons of the litigation explosion." 8'
Olson takes a similar approach. He argues that our national
focus on litigation
has done cruel, grave harm and little lasting good. It has helped
sunder some of the most sensitive and profound relationships of
human life: between the parents who have nurtured a child;
between the healing professions and those whose life and wellbeing are entrusted to their care. It clogs and jams the gears of
commerce, sowing friction and distrust between the productive
enterprises on which material progress depends and all who buy
their products, work at their plants and offices, join in their
undertakings. It seizes on former love and intimacy as raw
materials to be transmuted into hatred and estrangement. It
exploits the bereavement that some day awaits the survivors of us
all and turns it to an unending source of poisonous recrimination.
It torments the provably innocent and rewards the palpably
irresponsible. It devours hard-won savings and worsens every
animosity of a diverse society. It is the special American burden,
the one feature hardly anyone admires of a society that is otherwise
82
envied the world around.
Olson's litany serves as a fitting summary of the arguments surveyed
in this section. To these critics, America's abiding legal faith is our
cultural albatross, leading us inevitably towards dissolution and ruin.
Possible Responses to the Critics
For those who seek to defend the value of our nation's legal
faith, there are numerous responses to these critics that could be (and
have been) advanced.
First, of course, one could challenge the accuracy of the premises
from which the critics begin. Is it really true that, in some nostalgic
C.

77. Id at 4.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id
82. OLSON, supra note 71, at 2.
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period before the 1960s, we were a unified culture with a shared set of
values? Were we actually less adversarial? 83 One need only read
accounts of litigiousness in colonial America 84 or recall episodes in
our history like the Civil War, the beginning of the labor movement,
the Red Scare of the 1920s, or McCarthyism to question whether the
85
yearned-for era of community ever existed.
We might also question whether a growing unwillingness to
cooperate is truly traceable to our increasing resort to legal solutions.
Perhaps the perceived increase in "legalism" merely reflects the fact
that more people have access to the legal system than in the past.
After all, there can be little doubt that various segments of the society
now have recourse to law who were essentially unheard before.
Or, we might oppose these critics on the ground that their
arguments are thinly disguised attempts to reimpose norms of social
control and hierarchical dominance that were challenged in the 1960s
and thereafter. Thus, we might observe that these authors are really
serving the interests of entrenched (and often legally enforced) power
in society and only oppose the use of law when it gives power to
minorities against majorities or individuals against corporate
interests.
Finally, we might simply say, yes, we now have more rights, more
regulations, and more litigation, and yes these changes may have
down-sides, but we must balance these cultural costs against the good
that has been achieved. Under this approach, we might acknowledge,
for example, that some of the assertions of rights in recent years may
go too far or may lead to intractable battles, but we might
nevertheless say that, partly as a result of "rights talk," we have a
freer and more egalitarian society, with increased opportunities for

83. For example, Marc Galanter has repeatedly cast doubt on claims that we are
experiencing a "litigation explosion" or that court dockets are in general more crowded
today. See generally Marc Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
LIABILITY LAW 18 (Walter Olson ed., 1988); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An
Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); Marc Galanter, The Day After the
Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); see also generally MARC GALANTER &
THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS (1991).

84. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4,41 (1983).
85. In the alternative, one could argue that the critics overstate the degree to which
American society is balkanized today. For one example of this argument, see generally
ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL: WHAT MIDDLE CLASS AMERICANS REALLY
THINK ABOUT GOD, COUNTRY, FAMILY,
RACISM, WELFARE, IMMIGRATION,
HOMOSEXUALITY, WORK, THE RIGHT, THE LEFT, AND EACH OTHER (1998).
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women and minorities.8 6 Likewise, we might admit that regulations
may sometimes stifle industry or be unnecessarily picky, but
nevertheless argue that, on balance, such costs are outweighed by the
benefits of increased safety in the workplace or greater
environmental protection. Or, we might concede that litigation may
often be cumbersome and impose social costs, but maintain that such
costs are outweighed by the fact that less powerful people in society
now have access to the legal system and can (at least occasionally)
challenge the actions of those with greater wealth or political might.
All of these potential responses have some merit, and I do not
necessarily disagree with any of them. Nevertheless, I think those
who would defend our nation's legal culture might do well to consider
another type of response. After all, none of the responses outlined
above addresses squarely the primary concerns expressed by these
critics: that our increasingly diverse nation is becoming increasingly
fragmented, that we have lost any way for the various balkanized
communities of this nation to converse about social issues, and that
we no longer have a shared belief in a common national enterprise.
Instead, the possible responses I have discussed either attack these
concerns as being incorrect (or secretly venal), or they accept these
social costs as a necessary evil that is outweighed by greater freedom
and egalitarianism.
Such responses are unlikely to convince the critics because they
do not sufficiently respect the very real alarm these critics articulate
about the fragmentation of our culture. Maybe the concerns are
incorrect and maybe they are less important than the need to offer a
voice to the powerless, but it seems to me that those who would
defend America's legal faith must acknowledge that these fears run
deep within the American populace and cannot simply be sloughed
off as incorrect or irrelevant.
Thus, for the purpose of this Essay I wish to accept the premises
of the critics as true. I will accept as given that Americans feel an
increasing sense of cultural dissolution and the loss of community
conversation and long for our social institutions to foster dialogue and
healing. The question then becomes whether the resort to law and
legal procedures can be defended on the ground that law can actually
help repair community fragmentation. Can law supply mechanisms
Can it provide a forum for
for healing and reintegration?
communication among divergent worldviews? And can it therefore
86. For an example of this type of balancing argument, see SAMUEL WALKER, THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (1998).
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help us to feel more unified without simply reimposing old
hierarchical relationships? In order to explore such questions, I will
turn to a series of legal proceedings in a completely different cultural
and historical context. Perhaps by looking outside our own legal
system, we can more effectively identify a transformative and healing
role for law in our own communities.
II. The "Tale": The Strange But True History of Legal
Proceedings Against Animals
In order to speculate about possible social roles law can play
within a community, it is first necessary to conceive of law broadly,
not merely as a set of behavioral rules or as a procedure for resolving
disputes or meting out punishment, but as a discourse for
conceptualizing reality.87 As anthropologist Clifford Geertz has
observed, "[law is not a bounded set of norms, rules, principles,
values, or whatever from which jural responses to distilled events can
be drawn, but part of a distinctive manner of imagining the real." 88
Thus, law is one mechanism through which we construct meaning
from the world around us. It is a "complex of characterizations and
imaginings, stories about events cast in imagery about
principles .... 89 These stories, or "narratives"' 90 provide a framework
to interpret what we experience and a language for describing reality.
Narratives are particularly relied upon in times of change,
disorientation, trauma, and conflict. For example, a disaster will
stimulate "pronouncements, prayers, eulogies, addresses, white
papers, and other formal offerings that later dissolve back into the
welter of conversation characterizing the ordinary business of living
together." 91
A society's social institutions must function as
storytellers at such crisis moments. Religious narratives and their
accompanying rituals are the clearest example of an institution
constructing meaning out of death and other irrational and
frightening events. 92 The rites link us to our past and future by
enacting enduring and underlying patterns. 93 And the narratives
provide explanations, or affirmations of faith, or parables, all of which
create a framework for understanding the crisis event and healing
87. See supra note 4.
88. GEERTZ, supra note 4, at 173.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 215.
See supra note 19.
Hariman, supra note 47, at 19.
L6vi-Strauss, supra note 19, at 186-204.
KERTZER, supra note 18, at 9-10.
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psychological wounds. Thus, it has been said that cultural narratives
provide a "shield against terror." 94
Courts too are social institutions that construct narratives in the
face of societal conflict, change, or trauma. And this story-telling
function may exist wholly apart from the more commonly understood
adjudicatory or coercive functions of law. Even judges, who are
involved on a practical, day-to-day level with the workings of our
legal system, have recognized the multi-faceted nature of legal
proceedings. For example, Harry T. Edwards, Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
recently acknowledged that one might think of trials as "rhetorical, as
well as fact-finding, events" where "different narratives are permitted
to compete for prominence, and 'victory' may involve more than a
judgment at trial. '' 95
It may be difficult to discern the cultural or symbolic aspects of
law and legal procedures when we are examining our own legal
system. Indeed, we are likely to be so accustomed to our own legal
rituals or so steeped in the traditional justifications for them that we
cease to look more carefully. By considering legal regimes that
appear to us to have no obvious rational basis, however, we may
better understand some of the cultural roles law might play. Thus, my
aim in discussing historical trials of animals is not to offer a definitive
explanation for why these trials occurred. Rather, if we can generate
a plausible account of the possible cultural roles these trials may have
fulfilled, we can think more creatively about the potential power of
law and legal procedures more generally. First, I will briefly sketch
the history of these proceedings, and then I will focus on a
representative trial and study how the language of the legal
proceeding articulated and adjudicated among various different
narratives for understanding a random misfortune. By surveying the
history of the animal trials, we may see them as an essential part of
the community's healing process in the face of incomprehensible
crisis.
A. History of the Animal Trials

The custom of putting animals (as well as inanimate objects) on
trial extends at least as far back as ancient Greece. On the north side
of the Athenian Acropolis stood a building called the Prytaneion,
94. Id at 4.
95. Harry T. Edwards, Comments on Mirjan Dama~ka's Of Evidentiary Transplants,
45 AM. J. COMP. L. 853,858-59 (1997).
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which acted as a ceremonial center of the city and as a site for special
social functions. 96 In addition, a law court located in the building was
dedicated to hearing only three kinds of cases: those in which (1) a
murderer was unknown or could not be found; (2) a death was caused
97
by an inanimate object; or (3) an animal had killed a human being.
Classics scholar Walter Woodburn Hyde has gathered together
the few references to the Prytaneion that exist in the extant Greek
literature. He concludes that, though ceremonial in character, the
trials observed ordinary procedural requirements. 98 Even jurisdiction
was sometimes at issue. In one instance, a boy was killed by a javelin
while watching a man practice in the gymnasium. 99 The court was
forced to determine whether the boy, the man, or the javelin was to
blame. Only if it were deemed to be a trial of the javelin could the
case be heard at the Prytaneion. 100 Such questions were apparently
taken very seriously. According to Plutarch, the great statesman
Pericles once spent an entire day arguing with the famous sophist
Protagoras about this issue.1 0
This dispute suggests that the action against an offending animal
or object was not conceived merely as a way of punishing a negligent
or guilty owner. Rather, the javelin was considered to be capable of
its own guilt, quite apart from the person who threw it, and the
community took action to rid itself of the moral taint attaching to the
object itself. Thus, the proceedings in the Prytaneion, like all other
murder trials, took place in the open air so that the judges would not
be contaminated by moral pollution emanating from the accused.10 2
If the court found the accused guilty, it issued an order banishing the
10 3
offending animal or object beyond the borders of the city.

96. Finkelstein, supra note 11, at 58; see also JOHN W. JONES, THE LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY OF THE GREEKS 256-57 (1977) (using the Latin spelling "Prytaneum").
97. Finkelstein, supra note 11, at 58; see also ARISTOTLE, CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS
AND RELATED TEXTS 135 (Kurt Von Fritz & Ernst Kapp trans., Hafner Pub. Co. 1950)
("When [one] does not know who committed the offense, he institutes proceedings against
'the person who did the deed.' The [officials at the Prytaneion] conduct prosecution[s] of
inanimate things and animals also.").
98. Hyde, supra note 5, at 704.
99. Id. at 697-98.
100. Id.
101. 1 PLUTARCH'S LIVES 260 (Arthur H. Clough ed., 1961).
102. Hyde, supra note 5, at 696-97; see generally JONES, supra note 96. at 254-57

(discussing the conception of pollution in ancient Greece and methods used to diminish its
danger).
103. JONES, supra note 96, at 256-57; see also, e.g., D.M. MACDOWELL, ATHENIAN
HOMICIDE LAW IN THE AGE OF THE ORATORS 86-87 (1963) (quoting Demosthenes (352

B.C.E.)) ("[I]f an inanimate object falling on someone hits him and kills him, a trial is held
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Turning to animal trials in Europe, because we must rely on
isolated references from fragments of court records and written
documentation preserved in archives of small towns around Europe,
it is impossible to tell just how many trials were held.1°4 The evidence
indicates, however, that the practice was widespread and long-lived.
A 1906 work by modem and classical language scholar E.P. Evans,
The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals, still
contains the most complete listing of animal trials to date. He cites
over two hundred cases, occurring between 824, in which moles were
tried in the valley of Aosta, 05 and 1906, the year of his writing, when
a dog was sentenced to death in Switzerland. 10 6 The trials occurred in
nearly every country in Europe (as well as isolated cases in England,
Brazil, Canada, and the United States). 1°7 A majority of the cases
involved pigs that ran freely through the streets of medieval towns
and so were frequently involved in altercations, particularly with
small children. 108 Pigs were not the only defendants, however, for
there are records of proceedings against asses, beetles, bulls,
caterpillars, cocks, cows, dogs, dolphins, eels, field mice, flies, goats,
grasshoppers, horses, insects, leeches, locusts, moles, rats, serpents,
sheep, slugs, snails, termites, turtledoves, weevils, wolves, worms, and
other unspecified vermin. 1 9
The bulk of the recorded cases arose in France during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it would be inaccurate to
assume that the list of recorded trials is exhaustive or that the
patterns indicate anything more than that there were better court
records kept in some eras than others." 0 The sketchy record-keeping
makes it likely that there were many more trials held than the two
for it in [the Prytaneion] and it is cast beyond the frontier."); H. MYERS & J.
BRZOSTOWSKI, DRUG AGENTS' GUIDE TO FORFEITURE OF ASSETS 2-3 (1981) (quoting

Aeschines the Greek (389-14 B.C.E.)) ("[W]e banish beyond our borders sticks and
stones ... if they chance to kill a man."); Finkelstein, supra note 11, at 58 (quoting Pollux
(2d century A.D.)) ("[The Prytaneion] was presided over by the phylobasileis, whose duty
it was to remove beyond the border the inanimate object which had fallen upon the
man.").
104. See Finkelstein, supranote 11, at 67-68.
105. Evans consistently identifies place names by province or town, presumably based
on the name listed in the actual court records. EVANS, supra note 5, at 313. Since some of
these towns may no longer exist or may have changed names, it is often difficult even to
identify the present-day country that corresponds to Evans' appellations.
106. IL at 334.
107. Id. at 313-34.
108. Cohen, Folklore,supra note 5,at 11.
109. EVANS, supra note 5, at 313-34.
110. Id at 137; Finkelstein, supranote 11, at 67-68.
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hundred Evans was able to discover. In the earliest French record of
an animal trial in 1266, for instance, historian Esther Cohen reports

that the matter-of-fact manner in which the proceedings are recorded
would seem to indicate that the custom had long been in existence by

that time."' In addition, we can find references to animal trials in the
works of Victor Hugo, 112 Racine, 113 and Shakespeare, 114 indicating
that the general public was likely familiar with the practice.
When a domestic animal caused the death of a human being, the
115
beast was treated in all ways possible the same as a human criminal.

Animals were confined in human prisons and subjected to the same
treatment as human prisoners. 116 Once the trial began, it too was
111. See Cohen, Folklore, supra note 5, at 20 (citing execution of a pig at Fontenay-auxRoses).

112. In his nineteenth-century novel Notre-Dame de Paris, Hugo describes the trial of a
goat belonging to the gypsy Esmerelda.

See VICTOR HUGO, NOTRE-DAME DE PARIS

330-32 (Alban Krailsheimer trans., 1993) (1831); see also id. at 330 ("At that time nothing
could be simpler than putting an animal on trial for sorcery.").
113. In 1688, the French playwright Racine devoted a whole play to a parody of the
animal trials. In Les Plaideurs(The Suitors), a dog is tried for stealing and eating a capon.
The prosecution and defense lawyers address the court in flowery and overblown rhetoric
complete with quotations from the Bible and Aristotle. The accused is condemned to the
galleys. As his last plea for mercy, the defense counsel brings into court a litter of puppies,
and appeals for clemency:
Come hither, you family desolate;
Come, little ones, whom he would orphans render,
Give utterance to your understandings tender.
Jean Racine, Les Plaideurs [The Suitors], in 7 THE DRAMA: ITS HISTORY, LITERATURE
AND INFLUENCE ON CIVILIZATION 283, 318 (Alfred Bates ed., Irving Browne trans.,
1903) (1688). The judge is moved by the plea because he too is a father and cannot let the
young puppies grow up as orphans. See id. at 318-20. Not only does Racine's parody
indicate that he knew the animal trials would be very familiar to his audience, but it is also
one example of the criticism that seems to have accompanied the animal trials from the
inception of the practice.
114. Gratiano refers to animal trials in The Merchant of Venice:
Thy currish spirit
Governed a wolf who, hanged for human slaughter,
Even from the gallows did his fell soul fleet.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1. See also notes of

editor Kenneth Myrick: "Wolves, dogs, and other animals were sometimes hanged for
killing or attacking people; hence the phrase hangdog look." THE COMPLETE SIGNET
CLASSIC SHAKESPEARE 629 n.134 (Kenneth Myrick ed., 1963).
115. For a description of European criminal procedure at the time with regard to
human beings, see generally ADHEMAR ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 55-177 (John Simpson trans., 1913)

(discussing criminal

procedure in the feudal era through the sixteenth century); see also O.F. ROBINSON ET
AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 44-58, 335-76 (1985).
116. For example, in the town of Pont de Larche, records from the fifteenth century
indicate that the sheriff at one time paid a particular prison-keeper the sum of nineteen
sous six deniers tournois "for having found the king's bread for the prisoners detained, by
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conducted along precisely the same lines as that of a human
defendant.
The prosecution was represented by professional
advocates, and defense lawyers were also hired." 7 Witnesses and
evidence were heard prior to judgment. And though the animals
were usually found guilty, such a verdict was certainly not assured.
On January 10, 1457, a sow was convicted of "murder flagrantly
committed on the person of Jehan Martin, aged five years, the son of
Jehan Martin of Savigny," and sentenced to be "hanged by the hindfeet to a gallows-tree." Her six sucklings, found at the scene of the
crime stained with blood, were included in the indictment as
accomplices, but "in lack of any positive proof that they assisted in
mangling the deceased, they were restored to their owner, on
condition that he should give bail for their appearance, should further
evidence be forth-coming to prove their complicity in their mother's
118
crime."
In 1750 at Vanvers, France, a man was convicted of bestiality for
having sex with a donkey. The man was sentenced to death. The
animal, however, was acquitted on the ground that she was the victim
of violence and had not participated in her master's crime of her own
free will. At the trial, the defense had presented a statement signed
by many inhabitants of the commune stating that they had known the
donkey for four years, that she had always shown herself to be
virtuous and well-behaved both at home and abroad and had never
given occasion of scandal to anyone, and that therefore, "they were
willing to bear witness that she is in word and deed and in all her
habits of life a most honest creature." This document seems to have
had a decisive influence upon the judgment of the court. 119
As with human defendants, the animals could also receive a
pardon prior to punishment. On September 5, 1379, as two herds of
pigs, one belonging to the commune and the other to the priory of St.Marcel-le-Jeussey, were feeding together near that town, three pigs
from the communal herd mortally wounded the son of the game-

reason of crime, in the said prison." The jailer gave the names of the persons in custody,
and concluded the list with "Item, one pig, conducted into the said prison and kept there
from the 24th of June, 1408, inclusive, till the 17th of the following July," when it was
hanged "for the crime of having murdered and killed a little child." The jailer charged two
deniers tournois a day for the pig's board, the same as for boarding human prisoners.
EVANS, supra note 5, at 340-41.
117. See, e.g., icL at 38 (noting the name of the defense lawyer for a group of insects in a
trial in 1545).
118. Id. at 153-54.
119. Id. at 150-51.
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keeper. 120 The three sows were tried and condemned to death. Both
the herds were believed to have encouraged the crime by their cries
and aggressive action, which indicated approval of the attack.
Therefore, all the pigs were arrested as accomplices and sentenced by
the court to death as well. But the prior, Friar Humbert de Poutiers,
not wanting to lose his entire herd, sent a petition to Philip the Bold,
Duke of Burgundy, asking for clemency for all but the three
instigating pigs. 121 The Duke pardoned the animals and released
them. Significantly, the language of the remission did not question
The Duke
the legitimacy of the practice of trying animals.
proclaimed that the mayor had arrested the pigs "in order to execute
reason and justice in the proper manner." Nevertheless, since only
the three pigs were truly guilty, the order concluded that "while
justice was done to the three or four said pigs, the rest should be
22
released.,,
Assuming there were no remission, the offending animal was
executed, usually by hanging. There are also recorded instances of
animals being burnt at the stake or buried alive. 123 Even in the
execution, the customs were the same for animals and human beings.
Sometimes the animal was actually dragged through the streets as was
the practice with a human criminal. 124 If it accidentally escaped, an
effigy was burned, again mirroring the treatment of human
defendants. Animals were even put in the rack prior to the execution
125
in order to extort "confessions."'
In contrast to these murder and bestiality cases, many other trials
of animals involved large groups of pests that caused hardship
throughout the community or created a public nuisance. In these
instances, there was neither a single victim nor one animal to hold
responsible, and so the entire rural commune became the plaintiff,
revealing, even more than the murder trials, how directly the
community participated in these judicial rituals.
Unlike the murder trials, the pests in question before the court
had not committed any specific crime, and it was often argued by
defense counsel that these animals were merely obeying God's
command to be fruitful and multiply throughout the land. The trials
thus served as the scenes for "extremely thorough debates concerning
120. For an account of this trial, see id. at 144-45.
121. Id.
122. COHEN, CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 112.

123. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 5, at 147.
124. COHEN, CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 113.
125. EVANS, supra note 5,at 139.
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the roles and interchanging relationships of God, man, animals and
the vegetable world that fed all of God's creatures.' 1 26 Since no
individual animal could be punished, these trials often ended with
anathemas' 2 7 and excommunications placed on the guilty party by an
ecclesiastical tribunal.
All of the animal trials evince a scrupulous concern for ensuring
procedural justice to the nonhuman defendants. In a fourteenthcentury Swiss trial against some Spanish flies, for example, the judge
ordered the appointment of counsel to represent the flies "in
consideration of their small size and the fact that they had not yet
reached their majority."' 28 Likewise, at the conclusion of a 1519 trial
against some field-mice in western Tyrol, an agreement was reached
whereby the mice would be moved to a new tract of land. The
defense lawyer demanded that they should be provided with a "safe
conduct" securing them against harm or annoyance from dog, cat, or
other foe. The judge agreed, but only as it applied to the weakest
field-mice. He therefore mitigated the sentence of perpetual
banishment by ordering that "a free safe-conduct and an additional
respite of fourteen days be granted to all those which are with young
and to such as are yet in their infancy; but on the expiration of this
reprieve each and every must be gone, irrespective of age or previous
condition of pregnancy."' 29
B. The Animal Trials as a Forum for Competing Narratives

The trials of animals all began with the breach of a social norm.
Either an animal killed a human being, or a group of animals, such as
the rats of Autun, created human deprivation. Such random acts of
violence necessitated some type of societal response to reassert order.
As Michel Foucault has noted, in the medieval world,
the ravages of disease and hunger, the periodic massacres of the
epidemics, the formidable child mortality rate, the precariousness
of the bio-economic balances-all this made death familiar and
gave rise to rituals intended to integrate it, to make it acceptable
and to give meaning to its permanent aggression. 130

126. COHEN, CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 119.
127. "Anathemas" were formal ecclesiastical curses, usually accompanied
excommunication. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 78 (1986).
128. EVANS, supra note 5, at 110-11.
129. See iL at 111-13.

by

130. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 55

(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1977) (1975).
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Thus, the community was forced to construct a narrative, or provide

"social meaning,"' 3' responding to the sense of lawlessness and
healing the breach of the societal order. Seen in this light, the trial of
an animal may have functioned, at least in part, as a way for the

community to debate possible explanatory narratives. Ultimately, the
trials may have allowed the community to establish cognitive control,
to impose order on this world of random violence, and to create a

narrative that made sense of inexplicable events by redefining them
as crimes and placing them within the rational discourse of the trial.
In this section, I will focus on one trial in more detail, a sixteenth
century proceeding against weevils 132 that were destroying vineyards
in the town of St. Julien, 133 so that we can see how this process may
have played out. This trial, which seems typical of the conduct of the
animal trials, provides a particularly clear understanding of how the
proceedings adjudicated among different social constructions of
reality even as they addressed the stated issue of guilt and innocence.
At the trial, the arguments of the advocates often echoed
philosophical and spiritual debates in the society at large regarding
the proper ordering of the universe. Thus, the trial served to
reinforce the order of the human community while also providing a
ritual forum for the members of that community to debate possible
narratives for understanding the chaotic world around them.

131. Some scholars have preferred to use the term "social meaning" to describe the
broad inquiry I encapsulate in the word "narrative." See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). But regardless of the label,
both concepts are similar attempts to speak of "the frameworks of understanding within
which individuals live, a way to describe what they take or understand various actions, or
inactions, or statuses to be; and a way to understand how the understandings change." Id.
at 952.
Both of these concepts must be distinguished, however, from the idea of a "social
norm." Cass Sunstein has defined "norms" to be "social attitudes of approval and
disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done." Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 911 (1996). Although
the study of social norms is obviously related to the study of how meaning is constructed,
(and a social norm is certainly a "narrative" as I use that term), it is important to
understand that the issue of social norms centers more on the question of the optimal
societal rules for external behavior,whereas I have chosen to pursue a less normative and
more psychological account of how people come to apprehend and describe reality, as well
as the possible effect these narrative choices might have for the community.
132. Weevils are a particular type of snout-nosed beetle. WEBSTER'S THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2592 (1986).
133. I have previously described this trial in Berman, Narratives,supra note 13, at 31013. For a full account, see EVANS, supra note 5, at 37-49. See also Hyde, supra note 5, at
705-06 (summarizing the trial).

November 2000]

HISTORICAL TRIALS OF ANIMALS

The proceedings against the weevils were actually divided into
two trials, spaced some thirty years apart. The original complaint was
made by the wine-growers of St. Julien in 1545. Attorneys were hired
to defend the animals. After an initial presentation by both sides, the
ecclesiastical court dismissed the case in a proclamation
recommending that public prayers would be the requisite first step in
the proceedings.34 After first declaring the court's desire not to act
rashly against God's creatures, the order then gave instructions
prescribing a series of prayers. The required rituals included three
consecutive days of high mass followed by a religious procession
around the vineyards to be joined by at least two persons of every
the
household. 135 A signed document in the court records attests that
136
after.
soon
disappeared
weevils
the
that
and
given
were
prayers
Even in this first stage of the trial, we can see how the court
shaped a narrative for understanding the destruction brought on by
the weevils. Back in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas, in his
Summa Theologiae, had questioned whether it was permissible to
curse irrational creatures. He argued that curses and blessings should
only be pronounced on beings that could receive evil or good
impressions from them, and so such spells could only be aimed at
rational and sentient beings. Because animals were devoid of
understanding, they could not, in Aquinas' view, commit a wrong.
Aquinas concluded that, if animals are regarded as creatures coming
from the hand of God and employed by Him as agents for the
execution of His judgments, then cursing them constitutes blasphemy.
On the other hand, if animals are treated as lesser, nonrational
creatures, then cursing them is "idle and futile and therefore
wrong."'1 37 Choosing the first of these formulations, the ecclesiastical
court in St. Julien viewed the animals as God's creatures; therefore,
the devastation was seen as a sign passed from God to human beings
through the animals.
134. EVANS, supra note 5, at 38-39 (quoting court proclamation):
Inasmuch as God, the supreme author of all that exists, hath ordained that the
earth should bring forth fruits and herbs ... not solely for the sustenance of
rational human beings, but likewise for the preservation and support of insects,
which fly about on the surface of the soil, therefore it would be unbecoming to
proceed with rashness and precipitance against the animals now actually accused
and indicted; on the contrary, it would be more fitting for us to have recourse to
the mercy of heaven and to implore pardon for our sins.
135. I& at 39.
136. 1&
137. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 207 (2a-2ae, q. 76) (Thomas Gilby
trans., Blackfriars 1975) (1290).
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The second stage of the trial began thirty years later, when the
weevils returned to the same vineyard. In the complaint, the
petitioners stated that the animals had "resumed their depredations
and are doing incalculable injury.' 138 Because the original defense
lawyers had died, the petition asked that new advocates be appointed
to defend the weevils in excommunication proceedings.
After a brief adjournment, the weevils' newly appointed counsel,
Pierre Rembaud, answered the complaint with a plea to dismiss the
case. Rembaud stated that the animals had done nothing to make
themselves worthy of excommunication. Citing the Book of Genesis,
he argued that the lower animals were created before Man and that
God blessed all the living creatures of the earth.1 39 The Creator
would not have given this blessing unless he intended that the
creatures would be able to sustain themselves. In fact, the Bible
states that God ordered that "to every thing that creepeth upon the
earth every green herb has been given for meat.' 140 Therefore,
Rembaud argued, the weevils had a prior right to the vineyards,
conferred upon them at the time of creation. In addition, defense
counsel contended that, because animals could only be subject to
natural law and instinct, bringing them within human jurisdiction
would be absurd and unreasonable. 141 Rembaud thus introduced two
alternative narratives on behalf of the animals.
The first
conceptualized the acts of the weevils as part of God's ultimate
scheme for all creatures of the earth. The second declared that
animals could not be understood or judged at all in human terms.
When the prosecuting attorney presented a document detailing
the misery suffered by the villagers on account of the weevils, the
defense requested, and was granted, a second adjournment to review
the submission. In the meantime, Franqois Fay, the commune's
advocate, offered his reply. Fay argued that, although the animals
were created before human beings, they nevertheless were made
subservient to the needs of human beings, who maintain dominion
over the earth. 142 Fay's narrative asserted a hierarchy and order to
the universe that insisted on human jurisdiction over animal behavior.
The defense answered only by stating that it had not yet received
a copy of the document that had been presented, and so the case was
adjourned again. When the parties returned to court, Antoine Filliol,
138. EVANS, supra note 5, at 42.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 42-43.
Genesis 1:30.
EVANS, supra note 5, at 43.
Id. at 44.
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an attorney for the insects, responded to Fay by arguing that the
subordination of the lower animals to Man did not confer a right to
excommunicate them.143 In addition, he returned to the argument
that animals could only be subject to natural law, "a law originating in
the eternal reason and resting upon a basis as immutable as that of
the divine law of revelation, since they are derived from the same
source, namely, the will and power of God."' 144 Filliol's narrative, like
Fay's, acknowledged a hierarchy and order to the universe, but
positioned God as the only dominant adjudicator.
While this legal wrangling continued, the inhabitants of St. Julien
organized a public meeting in the town square. At the meeting, the
villagers decided to set aside land outside the vineyards for the
weevils, so that the insects might live freely away from the town.
After selecting a piece of property, the townspeople drew up an
elaborate contract with the weevils, giving the insects the right to an
area known as La Grand Feisse.145 The contract even went so far as
to specify the land in question by its precise location, dimensions, and
the character of its foliage and herbage. The contract reserved for the
villagers the right to pass through the land "without prejudice to the
pasture of the said animals," and to make use of the springs of water
contained therein, which were also to be at the service of the
weevils. 146 In addition, the town would retain the right to extract
minerals from the area as long as the insects were not harmed.
Finally, the contract permitted the townspeople to take refuge on the
weevils' land in time of war.
By creating this contract, the townspeople implicitly asserted that
the weevils possessed free will. According to this narrative, rational
negotiation could lead to peaceful coexistence of human beings and
animals in the natural world. If the animals could be convinced to
leave through the use of incentives that would appeal to human
beings, the animals could be understood as somehow similar to
human beings and motivated by the same desires. Thus, not only
would order be restored and the crops saved, but the animals would
be rendered more familiar and therefore not as threatening.
When the commune's counsel appeared in court and demanded
enforcement of the contract, the defense requested another delay to
review the agreement, and the proceedings were adjourned for an
143. Id at 45.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 46-47.
146. Iat at 46.
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additional six weeks. After the court reconvened, Filliol, the weevils'
attorney, objected that the land offered to his clients was sterile and
not able to fulfill the weevils' subsistence needs. When the commune
insisted that the land was suitable for insects, the court adjourned
again after appointing experts to examine the area and to submit a
written report of its fitness as a home for the weevils. The court's
actions evince a concern that the contract be fair, thereby implicitly
adopting a narrative that abstract principles of justice could be
applied to animals, and that the weevils would likewise acknowledge

the supremacy of such principles.
Ironically, the final decision of the case cannot be ascertained
because apparently some insects destroyed the last page of the trial
records. Evans fancifully suggests that the weevils might have been
147
dissatisfied with the decision and eaten the paper in retaliation.
From a twentieth-century perspective, it seems hard to imagine
that people really believed a judicial proceeding would encourage
weevils to stop destroying the vineyards or that by hanging a pig,
other animals would be deterred from committing crimes.t 4
Although we might be tempted to dismiss the proceedings as a
product of superstitious or religious thinking, 49 the significance of
these trials cannot truly be understood without analyzing the use of
legal proceedings to resolve the societal problems. 150 For example,
147. Id. at 49.

148. Not surprisingly, the bizarre nature of the trials has inspired several fictionalized
accounts, including a feature film, a novel, and a video work. See JULIAN BARNES, A
HISTORY OF THE WORLD IN 10
CHAPTERS 61-80 (1989); THE ADVOCATE (Miramax
Films 1994); Videotape: Rhyme 'em to Death (The Wooster Group 1994).
149. Of the very few scholarly accounts of the animal trials in the twentieth century.
most have dismissed the phenomenon as part of a primitive and barbarous past. See, e.g..
EVANS, supra note 5, at 186 (explaining these trials as indicative of "[t]he childish
disposition to punish irrational creatures and inanimate objects ... common to the infancy
of individuals and races"). Other writers viewed the trials in connection to the "animism
of primitive man." According to this theory, human beings erroneously endowed
inanimate objects with both a soul and human (or superhuman) mental facilities.
Finkelstein, supra note 11, at 48 (quoting HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW
AND STATE 3-4 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1961) (1945). Still another view is that the trials
were an outgrowth of the superstitious belief that the Devil could inhabit offensive beasts.
See Cohen, Folklore, supra note 5, at 16 n.31. For additional commentary dismissing the
trials in similar ways, see 3 SIR JAMES G. FRAZER, FOLK-LORE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
415-45 (1919); Frank A. Beach, Beasts Before the Bar, 59 NAT. HIST. 356 (1950); Joseph P.
McNamara, Animal Prisonerat the Bar, 3 NOTRE DAME LAW. 30 (1927-28); E.V. Walter.
Nature on Trial: The Case of the Rooster That Laid an Egg, in CIVILIZATIONS EAST AND
WEST 51 (E.V. Walter et al. eds., 1985).
150. Surprisingly, even Walter Woodburn Hyde, in his 1916 article on the animal trials.
ignored these jurisprudential questions despite the fact that he was writing in a legal
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even if we agree that there was widespread belief in the Church's
power to excommunicate those animals found guilty at trial, we must
still try to understand the importance of the court proceeding itself.

After all, it would have been much simpler to have a holy person
curse the offending animals without any prior judicial ritual.
Some commentators have suggested that, at least with regard to
individual animals, the trials might have served to deter negligence on

the part of the animal's owner. 151 However, such a justification
provides only a partial account, for, as Oliver Wendell Holmes has
observed, if the animal had been sold prior to the arrest, the new
152
owner would suffer the loss, not the allegedly culpable owner.
Other critics have viewed the seizing of animals as primarily a source
of revenue to the King and his feudal lords, and have explained the
practice on economic grounds. 153 This explanation too falls short. As
historian Esther Cohen points out, because the incarceration, trial,
and execution cost as much for an animal as for a human being, and
because the profit of the animal's labor was lost to the lord as well as

journal. Instead, Hyde merely recycled the ideas of philosopher Edward Westermarck,
stating that "[t]he savage, in his rage, obliterates all distinctions between man and beast,
and treats the latter in all respects as the equal of the former." Hyde, supra note 5, at 722
(discussing EDWARD WESTERMARCK, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL

IDEAS (2d ed. 1924)).

In contrast, Jacob Finkelstein, a professor of ancient literature, proposed in 1981 that
the trials did not indicate that people thought of the animals as rational beings. Instead,
he argued that people were extremely conscious of the fact that animals existed on a lower
level in the hierarchy of creation. By killing a human being, the animal infringed on that
order and was subject to punishment. Finkelstein, supra note 11, at 73 ("The visible
evidence of the breach of this order had to be removed-and removed in solemn public
procedure-in order that the cosmologic equilibrium would be widely recognized as
having been restored.").
Esther Cohen's recent book, Crossroadsof Justice, is distinctive because it explores
the relationship between the community and the judicial ritual of the animal trials. Her
analysis interweaves law and culture to create the most complex, nuanced picture of the
proceedings to date. COHEN, CROSSROADS, supra note 5. Because Cohen focuses only
on the medieval period, however, she does not raise broader questions about the social
function of trials. This Essay poses some of these more general questions. See also
Berman, Narratives,supra note 13.
151. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300-01.
152. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 11, 23-24 (Mark D. Howe ed.,
Harv. Univ. Press 1963) (1881) ("[It has been repeated from Queen Elizabeth's time to
within one hundred years, that if my horse strikes a man, and afterwards I sell my horse,
and after that the man dies, the horse shall be forfeited.").
153. See, e.g., Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP.
L.Q. 169,257 (1973).
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to the beast's owner, the trials and executions of animals often
154
deprived the King and the feudal lords of revenue.
In the end, although we might be able to invent any number of
possible theories to explain the animal trials, it is probably impossible
to decide upon a unifying rationale. No doubt the motivationspsychological, economic, religious-varied from community to
community, and from one social class to another. Thus, instead of
trying to explain the practice, it may be more fruitful to analyze the
trials on their own terms. These proceedings were public spectacles,
and they were conducted with the active participation of the
community. 155 The trials not only adjudicated a conflict, but also
served as a forum for debates about how best to come to terms with a
grave misfortune or a freak accident. By analyzing this discursive
function of the trials, we may be able to isolate various cultural roles
that may still have relevance to contemporary legal practice. In the
next section I identify three such roles and connect them to the
questions about America's legal faith with which I began.

III. The Transformative Potential of Law
So now we come to the crucial question: Can we conceive of a
role for law within a society that is generative rather than destructive?
Can we create a new narrative about America's abiding legal faith,
one that celebrates our reverence for law as among our greatest
cultural achievements? And how might my true "tales" of the rats of
Autun or the weevils of St. Julien help us to construct such a
narrative?
As a starting point, it may be useful to view law as a constitutive
element in what anthropologist Victor Turner has called a "social
drama."' 56 Turner outlined a four-part sequence to explain how
social dramas operate in society:
1) breach of regular norm-governed social relations; 2) crisis during
which there is a tendency for the breach to widen ...; 3) redressive
action ranging from personal advice to informal mediation or
154. COHEN, CROSSROADS, supra note 5,at 115.

155. It is important to note that the animal trials, like all criminal procedures of the
medieval era, were public. In the feudal period, for example, "[t]he hearing was usually
held in the open air, at the gate of the castle or at the public meeting-place of the town."
ESMEIN, supra note 115, at 56. Likewise, in Notre-Dane de Paris, Victor Hugo sets the
trial of Esmeralda's goat before a large crowd at the Great Chamber of the Palais de
Justice. HUGO, supra note 112, at 323-32.
156. VICTOR TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS 23-59 (1974); see also

Victor Turner, The Anthropology of Performance, in PROCESS, PERFORMANCE, AND
PILGRIMAGE 63 (1979) [hereinafter Turner, Anthropology].
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arbitration to formal juridical and legal machinery to the

performance of public ritual; 4) either the reintegration of the

disturbed social group or the social recognition and
57 legitimation of
irreparableschism between the contesting parties.
While the legal process obviously plays a role in the third,
"redressive" stage of the social drama by resolving the actual conflict,
the question is whether there is something about the resort to legal
solutions that may fulfill the fourth stage as well. Can legal discourse
provide a forum that encourages a "reintegration of the disturbed
social group" despite the inevitable jostling that occurs whenever
norms are contested?
A.

Three Possible Cultural Roles of the Animal Trials

As we think about the animal trials, we must ask ourselves why a
full legal proceeding was employed. Even if we assume that people
believed that the animals were morally culpable or that punishing one
animal might deter others, that does not answer the question of why a
formal trial was necessary. Certainly it would have been far easier
and less expensive simply to kill an animal that had become a public
nuisance. Thus, it appears that the resort to law must have fulfilled
some further cultural roles that simply killing the animal would not.
What possible roles can we envision?
I would like to suggest three possibilities, all of which should be
relevant in our thinking about the transformative potential of law
more generally. First, by bringing the animal transgressors within a
human scheme of justice, the trials may have helped the community
"domesticate" chaos by conceptualizing the animals not as
uncontrollable forces of nature, but as actual members of the
community who had simply committed a misdeed. Second, the
mechanism chosen-a legal trial-may have served to place societal
concern and debate about the breach into a rationalizing framework,
thus encouraging a formal dialogue built on appeals to philosophical
and legal principles. Third, the trials may have provided a forum in
which various parties, both inside and outside of the courtroom, could
offer a variety of narratives for understanding and coming to terms
with an act that shattered the community's peace. As a result of these
three aspects of the proceedings-the assertion of community
dominion, the establishment of a rationalizing framework, and the
creation of a forum for societal debate-the trials may have had a

157. Turner, Anthropology,supra note 156, at 63-64.
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therapeutic effect on the community over the long term, regardless of
the actual outcome.
(1) The Assertion of Community Dominion
When a transgressor behaves in some way contrary to society's
moral code, the community can choose to view the transgressor in
one of two ways. First, the community can close ranks by defining
itself in opposition to the transgressor and by treating the
transgression purely as an external threat. Or, second, the community
can claim dominion over the transgression by conceptualizing the
transgressor as a member of the community that has committed what
might be considered an internal offense. We may liken these two
strategies to the difference in the responses of the United States
Government to the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1995. The
Pearl Harbor bombing was seen as an offense perpetrated by an
outsider, and the government responded by fighting a war against a
threat that it could not control. With the World Trade Center
bombing, although some of the attackers were foreign nationals, the
government prosecuted them in U.S. courts. This action reflected a
conception of the perpetrators as community members to be
punished internally.
The choice to define a threat as internal or external is, in part, a
decision about jurisdiction. 158 When a community exercises legal
jurisdiction, it is symbolically choosing to assert its dominion over an
actor. This jurisdictional reach can serve to transform what otherwise
might have been considered an external threat into an internal
adjudication. Accordingly, the assertion of jurisdiction can be seen as
one way that communities domesticate chaos.
For example, in deciding how to respond to acts of violence or
depredation caused by animals, communities were faced with a choice
of whether to view the acts as internal or external threats. Random
acts of violence caused by insensate agents undoubtedly brought a
deep feeling of lawlessness: not so much the fear of laws being
broken, but the far worse fear that the world might not be a lawful
place at all. 159 To combat such a fear, it may have been essential to
view the animals not as uncontrollable natural forces belonging to the
outside world, but as members of the community who could actually
158. For further discussion of the symbolic ramifications of the assertion of jurisdiction,
see generally Cover, supra note 17.
159. Humphrey, supra note 15, at xxv.
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break the community's laws. By asserting dominion over the animals,
members of communities could assure themselves that, even if the
social order had been violated, at least there was a social order
capable of violation, and not simply undifferentiated chaos.
From this perspective, Bartolom6e Chassene's many procedural
excuses on behalf of the rats of Autun were not merely the clever
delaying tactics of a canny advocate, but, as one jurist of the time
described them, noble pleas for "the order and forms of justice."160
The trials were more than just a way of punishing animals; they also
represented an attempt by a community to apply its own moral
scheme to the natural world and create an integrated sense of justice.
Thus, Chassen6e's arguments (or those of Pierre Rembaud on behalf
of the weevils of St. Julien 1 61 ) reflected the conviction that justice was
universal, applicable to animals as well as human beings. 162
But the trials of animals and inanimate objects also reflected
more than just a global notion of justice. By trying an animal or an
object using the same formula applied to a human murderer, the
court was incorporating the human and nonhuman within one
community of justice. The trials applied the formal rules of court to
what otherwise would seem to be random and inexplicable acts of
irrational actors. In this way, the community integrated the offender
within its moral scheme, 163 thereby helping to heal the breach of the
social order.
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that in 1576, when a hangman,
without legal authority, killed a pig at the gallows after it had bitten
the ear off a child, the community viewed the act as being to "the
disgrace and detriment of the city." 64 The hangman was forced to
flee the town. An execution without the imposition of the forms of
justice was intolerable. Chassenre, too, railed against human beings
who chastised their domestic animals and put particularly dangerous
animals to death. To him, such an act was arbitrary and autocratic,
and if systematically applied to human beings would be denounced as
intolerable tyranny. Chassene insisted that under no circumstances
should one impose a penalty except by judicial decision. In support

160. COHEN, CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 121 (quoting DE THOU, supra note 7, at

414-16).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 139-141.
162. In fact, Cohen points out that medieval courts also tried the dead. See COHEN,
CROSSROADS, supra note 5,at 134-45.
163. Id. at 83-84.
164. EVANS, supranote 5, at 146-47.
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of the principle, he referred to the apostle Paul, who had declared in
165
the Bible that sin is not imputed where there is no law.
This scrupulous concern for according due process to animal
transgressors can be seen as a necessary part of restoring the
community's sense of social order. After all, simply lashing out to

destroy the animal would continue to imply that the animal was an
uncontrollable "other," a part of the "natural" world that could not
be reasoned with or domesticated. Such "unlawful" punishment
might even mean that the community symbolically had succumbed to
the disorder of the natural world and that it was now drawn into an
ongoing war with forces of darkness it could not control. Just as

retaliatory acts of a lynch mob are unlikely to restore a sense of order
to a community, so too punishment of animals without legal
procedures could well have increased the fear of the unknown that
1 66
Foucault associated with the medieval psyche.
165. Id. at 34-35.
166. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. One might well wonder why
communities would be concerned about providing due process to a pig when, presumably,
the same pig could have been slaughtered for food without the benefit of any procedural
protections at all. The answer may be that a human being killing an animal for food was
considered a "natural" occurrence, making resort to legal process unnecessary, whereas an
animal killing a human being was deemed a threat to the hierarchy of creation itself.
Combating such a threat to the established order perhaps required the use of legal rituals.
In support of that theory, it is interesting to note that the proceedings against animals
and inanimate objects, both in England and on the Continent, appear to derive from the
Bible where, in the Book of Exodus, an ox that killed a human being was sentenced to
death by stoning, and its flesh could not be eaten. Exodus 21:28-32. The punishment of
stoning is a distinctive sentence in the Bible, reserved for only a few types of crimes. In
those cases, there is no designated "executioner," for the community assembled is the
common executioner of the sentence. Offenses which entail this mode of execution must
therefore be of a character that, either in theory or in fact, "offend" the corporate
community or are believed to compromise its most cherished values to the degree that the
commission of the offense places the community itself in jeopardy. Finkelstein, supra note
11, at 26-27. Stoning is also called for in the Bible as a punishment for worshiping foreign
gods, being a disloyal son, being a non-virginal bride, and engaging in adultery, child
sacrifice, sorcery, necromancy, blasphemy, sedition, and violation of the Sabbath. Id. at
27.
The common denominator of all the offenses entailing the punishment of death
by stoning is that they are thought to strike at the moral and religious fibers
which the community as a whole sees as defining its essence and integrity. Such
crimes, in other words, amount to insurrections against the cosmic order itself.
Id. at 27-28.
The Biblical treatment of the ox indicates that actions against non-human
transgressors were treated as crimes against the community as a whole. Moreover, it was
irrelevant whether or not the ox was "morally" guilty. Rather, the guilt was treated as an
objective contagion that "must be eradicated in the most public way, and the public must
participate in the act of eradication as a demonstration that it is consciously and effectively
restoring the order that had been disturbed." Id. at 58.
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Instead, the trials implicitly constructed a narrative asserting that
animals, along with human beings, were part of a community and
subject to universal norms of justice. Paradoxically, even though the
trials often resulted in the execution of the individual animal, the
proceedings, by their very nature, first insured that the animal was
conceptualized as a member of the community. Thus, the trials may
have fulfilled Turner's stage four1 67 by "reintegrating" the
transgressor within the social group, even as that transgressor was
punished for committing a crime.
(2) The Establishmentof a RationalFramework
The animal trials also may have permitted members of a
community under siege to channel their feelings of misfortune into a
formal, ritualized framework and a more abstract legal language.
Instead of feeling victimized by the inexplicable destruction of their
vineyards, for example, the wine-growers of the town of St. Julien
could attend the trial1 68 and feel that they were part of a more
ordered universe, where formal codes of procedure governed, and
legal rules and principles offered both explanation and guidance.
The trials therefore offered a type of formalized discourse that,
in and of itself, may have helped members of the community respond
to feelings of anger and helplessness. This capacity of law to
transform private rage has been recognized at least as far back as
ancient Greece. In the last play of Aeschylus' Oresteia trilogy, the
Furies, avenging spirits of the slain Clytemnestra, create misfortunes
across the land. In response, Athena "remands" the case of Orestes
to a human court in Athens. By this act, the Furies are transformed
into the Eumenides, and the community is healed. 169 Thus, "The
Oresteia ushers in the luminous idea of law, not force, as the mediator
u7 0
between self and community.'
It has often been observed that legal systems historically arose as
an alternative to private retributive violence by offering the coercive
power of the state to replace the unchecked passions of individual
actors. 171 In common with this view, I too suggest that the animal
trials may have offered an alternative to private suffering and
167. See supra text accompanying note 157.
168. See supra note 155.
169. Aeschylus, The Eumenides, in ORESTEIA 133, 151-52, at 11.470-89 (Richmond
Lattimore trans., 1953).
170. Burt Neuborne, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralism, Community and Hate
Speech, 27 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 371,372 (1992).
171. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 152, at 6.
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incomprehension. My point is somewhat different, however, for I am
not so much concerned with the animal trials as a demonstration of
state (rather than private) power, as with the way in which the very
format of a trial and the use of legal discourse may have had a
therapeutic effect on the "victims" of the animals' "crimes."
Accordingly, instead of concentrating on the coercive force behind
the trials, I choose to focus on the potential symbolic impact of the
trials themselves. From this perspective, the most important healing
aspect of the trials may have been not the demonstration of state
power but the ability of the trials to construct a ritual proceeding
composed of explanatory narratives.
It is in this context that we may perhaps understand the
involvement of the townspeople of St. Julien in the trial of the
weevils. According to the records of the proceedings, the members of
the community participated in two primary ways beyond simply
initiating the action: first, they engaged in a series of religious rituals
and prayers seeking relief from the scourge; second, they drew up a
legal contract with the weevils. Both actions can be understood as
appeals to the governing principles and ritual forms of an ordered
universe. The prayers symbolically invoked the rule of God, as well
as a set of philosophical arguments about the connection between
God's will, the actions of human beings, and the natural world. In
contrast, the contract implicitly asserted the primacy of human law
and appealed to the formal rules of human property relations as well
as the philosophical justifications for such rules. Thus, both cultural
mechanisms, though obviously quite different, transformed a
narrative of human suffering into a new discourse based on abstract
conceptions of order. The prayers shifted the focus to questions of
God's will and the possible role of animals as divine messengers. And
the contract negotiations insisted that the problems faced by human
beings are best addressed by resort to abstract governing principles of
the community.
(3) The Creationof a Forumfor Competing Narratives

Finally, as we saw with the trial of the weevils at St. Julien, the
animal trials appear to have functioned in part as a forum for
adjudicating among competing explanatory narratives regarding the
forces of nature. Thus, in considering the culpability of an animal, the
trials may also have helped determine how members of communities
would conceptualize the world around them. Were the animals to be
deemed messengers from God, or agents of Satan? Or, if they were
purely "natural" creatures, did they have some prior right to behave
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as Nature intended even if their actions harmed human beings? Or,
instead, were animals to be seen as lower than human beings in the
hierarchy of creation? Were animals capable of knowing when they
had committed offenses? Were animals rational actors? And should
animals be considered members of the human community of justice?
Could they even be guilty of crimes? Would punishment deter
animals from creating future misfortune? All of these questions were
raised both explicitly, in the arguments of the advocates, and
implicitly, in the fact that the debate itself was conducted as part of
the adjudicatory structure of a criminal trial.
The active participation of the townspeople of St. Julien in the
trial also indicates that this play of narratives was not exclusively a
formal legal event. Rather, the trials also functioned as public
performances:
[T]he public watching legal rituals was, despite its ostensible
passivity, perhaps the most important element in the entire picture.
Unless the spectacle spoke the language of the audience, used its

symbols and cultural perceptions, the entire purpose of the exercise
was lost. The judge in his gallery viewing a stage set at his orders
and the spectator in the crowd looking, jostling and being jostled,
shouting assent or dissent, were both participants in the legal
72

drama.1

As we have seen already, the language of the trials reflected
popular debates within the society about the relationship between
God, human beings, and animals. Indeed, the arguments of the
advocates echoed various scholarly opinions on the subject that had
been advanced by Aquinas and others. 173 Thus, the trials may have
provided a way for the community as a whole to take part in a debate
that otherwise would have been confined to scholarly discourse. On
this view, the animal trials served in part to provide a popular forum
for debating fundamental points of conflict within the community.
B. Some Thoughts on the Contemporary Potential of Law

Finally, we return to the concerns about contemporary legal
practice with which we began. In this last section, I offer ways we
might conceptualize the potential power of law as a productive forum
for addressing social rifts. And, in contrast to the critics discussed
earlier, I focus on the ways in which law has been or might be used to
172. COHEN, CROSSROADS, supranote 5, at 74.
173. For further discussion of this scholarly debate, see Berman, Forfeiture,supra note
13, at 305-09.
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Having isolated three
foster productive community discourse.
plausible cultural roles the trials of animals might have fulfilled, I ask
whether any of these roles might still be relevant. By taking seriously

such cultural roles, we may see that resort to legal solutions can
actually help facilitate the reintegration stage of Turner's social
74
drama.
(1) The Assertion of Community Dominion

Just as the animal trials implicitly communicated a symbolic
message that nonhuman transgressors were nevertheless subject to
human control, so too our contemporary notions of jurisdiction
continue to be linked to how we define the limits of the community
and who should be deemed a "member. ' 175 When a locality exercises

jurisdiction over an individual, it is implicitly sending a message both
to the individual and to the community at large that the individual is a
member of that community, at least with regard to the subject matter
76
of the case.

This exercise of jurisdiction can be part of a reintegrative process
in and of itself. For example, a person injured by a defective product
174. See supra text accompanying note 157.
175. For a related perspective on jurisdiction, see generally Cover, supra note 17.
176. Thus, we can understand the Supreme Court's expansion of the limits of long-arm
jurisdiction in this century as a reflection of the changing notion of community
membership in the United States. As interstate travel and commerce have grown, we are
increasingly part of a larger national community, and differences from state to state may
be less important. Indeed, the Court, in elaborating rules on jurisdiction, has explicitly
acknowledged changes in technology, transportation, and commerce, as key factors in the
jurisdictional calculus. See, e.g., McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
[The expansion of personal jurisdiction is in part] attributable to the
fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today
many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties
separated by the full continent.... At the same time modern transportation and
communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.
Id.
The link between jurisdiction and community membership has arisen again recently
in debates concerning the appropriate jurisdictional rules to be applied to online
interactions. Compare David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that cyberspace should be its
own jurisdiction), with Jack Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of
Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475 (1998) (arguing that
traditional jurisdictional rules can be applied to online transactions). For further
discussion of changing social conceptions of space and distance and their relation to the
determination of jurisdictional rules for online interaction, see generally Paul Schiff
Berman, The Internet, Community Definition, and the Social Meaning of Legal
Jurisdiction,in VIRTUAL PUBLICS: POLICY AND COMMUNITY IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE
(Beth E. Kolko ed., forthcoming 2001).
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may feel powerless to affect the behavior of a distant, seemingly
uncontrollable corporation. Indeed, just as the weevils may have
been viewed as an uncontrollable "other," so too the products of
global capitalism may seem to be external forces of destruction that
obey only their own law. By bringing the corporation within local
jurisdiction, the individual and the community may feel they have
regained some control over their world. And it may also be that,
because of the potential exercise of local jurisdiction, a multinational
corporation may, in turn, conceive of itself as a corporate citizen of
many different localities.
In addition, the ability to assert the jurisdiction of a court may
give people some sense of their own membership in the community.
A prison inmate bringing a civil rights action against an abusive
guard, for example, may feel partially vindicated simply by the fact
that he or she is able to invoke the jurisdiction of a court. Regardless
of outcome, the fact that the inmate's grievance is aired and
considered, however briefly, may give a marginal member of society
more of a sense of community affiliation. 177 Thus, the assertion of
community dominion may be therapeutic both for the community,
which can assert its control over otherwise uncontrollable behavior,
and for the individual, who achieves a form of community
membership through the legal process. Even a criminal defendant is
implicitly deemed to be a member of the community who has gone
astray.
The need to assert community dominion may also be a significant
part of our desire to use legal and quasi-legal proceedings to respond
to atrocities such as war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Arguably, the trial of accused Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie, held in
France several years ago, was less about punishing an individual
(who, after all, was extremely old and in failing health at the time of
the trial), than about asserting the community's sense of control after
a horrific and chaotic human tragedy. Psychologist Nicholas
Humphrey has noted a parallel between the animal trials and the
recent proceedings against Barbie:
Aren't we seeing again nothing other than people's need to make
sense of nonsensical events-to close the book on a chapter of
otherwise inexplicable calamity. Barbie's living presence in the
courtroom has almost no significance. If he were dead, his corpse
would serve the role of the defendant just as well. At the end of it,
177. See, e.g., Roland Acevedo, Thoughts of an Ex-Jailhouse Lawyer, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 5,
1998, at 2.
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Barbie's body will metaphorically 17be8 thrown into the Rhone. We
shall all feel curiously relieved ....
In addition, the assertion of community dominion may have
relevance in evaluating the usefulness of alternative legal procedures
aimed at restorative justice, such as the growing use 179 of truth
commissions as a mechanism for societal reconciliation. When
discussing the animal trials, we noted that part of the significance of
the trial was that it implicitly rendered the offending animal a
member of the community and not an outside entity. Similarly, the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) proceedings in South
Africa (to use the most recent example of the truth commission
model to date) have attempted to restore psychic membership in the
South African community to both victims and perpetrators. 180
Instead of a criminal prosecution against a non-participative "other,"
as at the trial of Adolph Eichmann after World War 11,181 the TRC
required that those perpetrators seeking amnesty first acknowledge
the community's jurisdiction by appearing before the Commission,
and then speak their misdeeds to the entire nation. Likewise, victims
who for years were not acknowledged as full-fledged members of the
South African community were given a forum both to speak about
their pain and to participate in the community's legal system instead
of remaining outside of it. Thus, the TRC proceedings implicitly
expressed the hope that victims, perpetrators, and spectators could all
be integrated into the new South African community. Whether or
not the TRC's effort is successful (and we will probably not be able
178. Nicholas Humphrey, Society Tommorrow (Body and Soul): Court in the Act,
GUARDIAN (London), June 3, 1987, quoted in Jack Smith, Putting Animals, Bugs and
Corpses on Trial Sounds Weird, but What's a Body to Do?, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1987, § 5,
at 1.

179. Priscilla B. Hayner, International Guidelines for the Creation and Operation of
Truth Commissions: A Preliminary Proposal, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 175
(1996) (finding that "[t]ruth commissions have been multiplying rapidly around the world
in recent years").
180. See generally S. AFR. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF

THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (1998). For further discussion of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission as well as other attempts to address issues of socalled "transitional justice," see generally MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998): RUTI

TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000). For a discussion of the Commission from the
point of view of South African jurists, see generally Richard J. Goldstone, Justiceas a Tool
for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and InternationalCriminal Tribunals,28 N.Y.U. J.

INT'L L. & POL. 485 (1996); Pius Langa, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 34 INT'L LAW. 347 (2000).
181. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM:

BANALITY OF EVIL (1963).
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fully to evaluate the question for many decades), the proceedings
were firmly premised on the reintegrative potential of law. At least
one American commentator has suggested that we might consider
such a commission ourselves to explore the history and legacy of race
relations in this country. 82 And the core idea of bringing parties to a
dispute or crime into a community forum to seek some form of
applications even in more
restorative justice may have practical
83
commonplace legal proceedings.
(2) The Establishmentof a RationalFramework

In looking at the animal trials, we speculated that the resort to
legal procedures and legal language can, in and of itself, help to
transform private anger and pain by providing both a rationalizing
discourse and a ritual setting. There are at least four reasons why a
legal framework might function in this way even today.
First, the language of legal argument almost inevitably requires
us to generalize from the specific facts and emotions of the particular
episode under consideration, and instead discuss more abstract rules
or principles. In the case of the weevils, for example, we can see that
the legal debate transformed the issue from the crop damage caused
by the animals in St. Julien to an argument about the proper
relationship of God, animals, and human beings in the ordering of the
universe. This tendency toward abstraction has sometimes been
criticized by contemporary commentators who argue that law may
sometimes distort personal narratives. 184 Nevertheless, a more
abstract narrative can provide a way of conceptualizing and coming to
terms with a painful event. If the vineyards are dying, legal narratives
debating the proper ordering of the universe or asserting that animals
are governed by established rules of contract and property may well
provide a therapeutic language for coming to terms with the
devastation.'8
Second, by forcing us to look beyond the particular emotions
generated by a traumatic event, legal language may allow us to
182. Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself. Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REV.
647,681-83 (1996).
183. See infra notes 201-208 and accompanying text.
184. See generally Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and
Sunday Shoes: Notes on Hearingof Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Martha Minow &
Todd Rakoff, Is the "Reasonable Person" a Reasonable Standard in a Multicultural
World?, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
185. See LA-vi-Strauss, supra note 19, at 197-98 (arguing that cultural narratives give
shape to pain and allow for effective response to crisis).
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develop a more thoughtful, nuanced view. For example, Ronald
Dworkin has argued that many of the clauses of the U.S. Constitution
cannot be understood except as appeals to moral philosophy.1 86 If so,
then it may be that arguments about contentious issues, when cast in
constitutional terms, encourage us to frame our debate as a discussion
about core philosophical values rather than as a question of political
expediency or rancorous name-calling. Instead of simply shouting at
each other about whether, for example, burning the American flag is
acceptable behavior, we may have a more profitable community
discussion when the argument is framed in the more abstract
language of our First Amendment jurisprudence.
Third, the formal, ritualized nature of the legal process may itself
be a source of comfort. Just as religious rites provide us with a
reassuring sense of order through their standardized repetition and
prescribed procedure, so too it is easy to imagine that victims of a
crime or plaintiffs in a product liability or mass tort action might well
find that the legal process, with its solemn tone, slightly archaic
language, and elaborate rules, provides some structure for their grief,
regardless of outcome.
Fourth, broad participation in legal rituals may reinforce a sense
of connection to the broader community. Robert Hughes' study of
the colonization of Australia illustrates the potential psychological
benefits of such participation. Hughes discusses the efforts of the
prison administrator Maconochie to reform the most oppressive and
seemingly hopeless penal colony, Norfolk Island. 187 Maconochie
determined that, because of their harsh treatment, the prisoners had
lost all sense of connection with the outside world and were not being
encouraged to think of themselves as full-fledged human beings. One
of his responses to this problem was to make sure that trials for
breaches of prison rules were held in the open Barrack Yard. As
Maconochie describes it, he engaged the prisoners "to act as Jurors,
Pleaders, Accusers, or otherwise, as the Case might be; I derived
extraordinary advantage from this ...in interesting the Body of the
Men in the Administration of Justice. Their sole Object on all
occasions had been to defeat it, but now they began to sympathise
with it ...."188 According to Maconochie, engaging the prisoners in
186. RONALD DWORKIN, The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise, in
FREEDOM'S LAW:

THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7-10

(1996).
187. ROBERT HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE 509 (1987). ] am grateful to Christopher
A. Stone for bringing this passage to my attention.
188. Id.
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the performance of law was crucial to reintegrating them into the
community beyond the penal colony.
(3) The Creationof a Forumfor Competing Narratives

Finally, in analyzing the trial of the weevils at St. Julien, we
noted that the legal proceedings functioned in part as a forum for
adjudicating among various different explanatory narratives. If, as
discussed earlier, narratives constitute the language we use for
conceptualizing reality, then it is particularly important that there be
societal mechanisms for debating these narratives. I would like to
suggest that law may be particularly well-suited for this role because
it is a social practice that explicitly recognizes the existence of many
different narratives and the importance of public conversation among
competing worldviews.
Both trials and judicial opinions, for example, ultimately
construct a narrative about a disputed event by rendering a decision
or verdict. They do so, however, only after first enacting a
performance in which the society "creates, tests, changes, and judges"
the various competing discourses that could make up our social
knowledge. 189 As James Boyd White has observed, law's strength is
precisely in its ability to provide a forum for testing the persuasive
power of competing narratives.
The multiplicity of readings that the law permits is not its weakness,
but its strength, for it is this that makes room for different voices,
and gives a purchase by which culture may be modified in response
to the demands of circumstance. It is a method at once for the
the acknowledgment of ignorance, and
recognition of others,
190 for
for cultural change.

In White's view, law provides a set of institutions that help construct
our society as "a discoursing community, committed to talking with
each other about our differences of perception, feeling, and value, our
differences of language and experience."' 191
Trials, because they are inherently multivocal, 192 most obviously
fulfill this vision. We have seen that participants in the animal trials
189. Hariman, supra note 47, at 29.
190. James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60
TEX. L. REv. 415,444 (1982).
191. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 80 (1990).
192. James Boyd White, Is Cultural Criticism Possible?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1370, 1373
(1986); see also Hariman, supra note 47, at 29 (arguing that "the popular trial fulfills a
special social function because it provides the social practice most suited to comparing
competing discourses"). For further discussion of this perspective, see generally JAMES

BOYD WHITE,

HERACLES'

Bow (1985).
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provided many different popular and scholarly interpretations, and
the proceedings therefore allowed the community to consider and
weigh the competing narratives.
It is not only trials that are multivocal, however, but legal
discourse itself (at least as traditionally practiced and taught in this
country). Let us consider, for example, the paradigmatic exchange
between teacher and student in a first-year law school classroom. The
student has an initial reaction to a case or an issue. Immediately, that
student is forced to confront multiple alternative narratives for
understanding the question. For instance, the student might be asked
to consider a less sympathetic set of facts, or to argue the issue from
the opposing party's point of view. Or the student might be forced to
address the question from the perspective of law and economics, or
critical legal studies. The teacher might point out the historical
reasons the law evolved in a contrary fashion. Ultimately, the debate
might include questions of public policy, judicial competence, the
appropriate division of responsibility among branches of government,
and the practical impediments to reaching a solution. In the end, the
student is encouraged to develop a more nuanced viewpoint, one that
takes greater account of all the various available narratives on the
issue. At its best, this process should be a lesson in tolerance for
opposing viewpoints, an exercise in humility through which the
student can develop a greater understanding and appreciation for
other ways of conceptualizing issues. From this idealized exchange,
we can envision law as a "method of individual and collective selfeducation, a way in which we teach ourselves, over and over again,
how little we can foresee, how much we depend on others, and how
193
important to us are the practices we have inherited from the past."'
Thus, we can perhaps tell a story of law as a terrain of
engagement among multiple populations and multiple worldviews.
And when we think of law in this way, we need not limit ourselves to
the idea that law is only the official discourse that takes place in
courtrooms and legal memoranda. Rather, law talk is dispersed
throughout the culture-in the newspaper accounts of legal decisions,
in the everyday conversations that invoke conceptions of legal rights,
and in the way law is portrayed in movies, on television, and in books.
Accordingly, we are all continuously producers and consumers of our
legal culture, and the story is always in flux. Indeed, all of these
multiple understandings and perspectives are inevitably part of the
language of justice. As one commentator has pointed out, "justice ...
193. WHITE, supra note 191, at 266.
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involves reconciling diversities into a restored and new multiple unity.
Justice requires a unity of differences; mutuality and1 94incorporation
rather than annihilation of opposites and distinctions.'
Such a unity is always provisional, always contingent, always
contested. As Richard K. Sherwin has recently observed, "It is
precisely the proximity of disorder-deriving from constant
contestation among conflicting discourse communities as well as from
the various irrational forces that surround and suffuse them-that
compels new forms of legal self-organization.... This is how law
adapts to the contingencies and vicissitudes of shifting social, cultural,
and technological (among other) developments." 195 In the end, law's
transformative potential in American culture rests on its availability
as a site for continuous self-criticism and re-creation. And the effort
to articulate principles of justice, the creation of fora for debating
those principles, the commitment to a culture of conversation about
them, and the recognition that clashes among various forms of
knowledge are inevitable and desirable-these are the aspects of law
we might want to celebrate, tell stories about, and strive to achieve.
On this view, the oft-criticized willingness of lawyers to espouse
any point of view regardless of personal belief does not necessarily
signal a cynical lack of conviction. Rather, it is an acknowledgment
that all points of view deserve to be aired. It is a recognition that
truth is contingent, that many different narratives are possible for
describing any single event. Indeed, one might even say that the very
language and structure of our legal processes are premised on the
idea of a discourse among multiple worldviews.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most fundamental concern expressed by those critics
of contemporary American legal practice discussed earlier is that, in
part because of our "jurismania,"'196 we as a nation have lost the
ability to speak in a common language or share a common set of
societal commitments. Such a concern stems in part from cultural and
political changes over the past forty years. During that time, various
political and critical strategies have quite effectively exposed old
historical "truths" and "values" as mere products of hierarchy. The
194. Jane Flax, The Play of Justice, in DISPUTED SUBJECrS:

ESSAYS ON

PSYCHOANALYSIS, POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 111,123-24 (1993).

195. SHERWIN, supra note 55, at 238-39.
196. See generally PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA:
LAW (1998).
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question is whether, in today's world, there is any way to develop
cultural unity without simply reimposing that hierarchy. I think the
answer is yes, and I think that legal discourse and legal proceedings,
because they are inherently structured as debates among conflicting
narratives, offer one possible forum for developing a shared
197
commitment to conversation and productive dialogue.
There can be little doubt that, over the past several decades,
anthropologists, literary critics, and legal scholars have challenged
traditional claims to truth. Instead of a world consisting of "facts" to
be discerned, these writers have argued that truth itself is contingent,
and that any claim to truth is inevitably a product of culture,
language, class, upbringing, gender, race, etc. Such an attack
inevitably aims "to disrupt and erode the power of the grand
normalizing discourses .... "198
In a typical example of this
antifoundationalist position, anthropologist Renato Rosaldo has
proclaimed that "classical modes of analysis, which in their pure type
rely exclusively on a detached observer using a neutral language to
study a unified world of brute facts, no longer hold a monopoly on
truth. Instead, they now share disciplinary authority with other
analytical perspectives."1 99
Building from this attack on all claims to objective truth,
feminists, multiculturalists, and others have argued that knowledge
itself is inherently biased and that we must be more aware of the
experiences, perspectives, and truths of those who have been ignored
or silenced in the past. For example,
Once there was a single narrative of national history that most
Americans accepted as part of their heritage. Now there is an
increasing emphasis on the diversity of ethnic, racial, and gender
experience and a deep skepticism about whether the narrative of
America's achievements comprises anything more than a selfcongratulatory story masking the power of elites. 200
In a world where traditional assertions of truth have lost their
automatic claims to legitimacy and more narratives than ever before
are given voice within the culture, the fear is that we have lost the
197. Of course, a shared commitment to conversation may not, in and of itself, produce
the more unified polity for which some critics seem to yearn. Nevertheless, as Lewis
Coser observed in 1956, maintaining fora for expressing social conflict may serve to
stabilize and unify social groups.

See generally LEWIS A. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF

SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956). I am grateful to Christopher A. Stone for suggesting the
relevance of Coser's work to my argument.
198. Flax, supra note 194, at 114.
199. ROSALDO, supra note 19, at xviii.
200. JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 1 (1994).
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ability to have a unified society at all. The critics discussed at the
beginning of this Essay see contemporary American legal discourse as
a part of this breakdown of community dialogue and consensusbuilding. Yet, it seems to me that our legal faith also provides us with
an opportunity.
By looking at the perplexing custom of prosecuting animals, we
have identified three potential cultural roles that law might fulfill.
First, the legal process can help to define membership in the
community and to provide a forum where individuals can both affirm
that membership and reconcile themselves with the society of which
they are a part. Second, the formal procedural rules and rationalizing
language of law can provide a comforting ritual and a more abstract
discourse for coming to terms with traumatic events. Third, law can
provide a forum for debating various explanatory narratives and a
language for encounter among differing worldviews. While it is
certainly true that many, perhaps most, legal proceedings do not fulfil
this potential, the important point is that the potential remains.
Accordingly, instead of decrying our national tendency to debate
social and political issues in legal terms, maybe we would do better to
acknowledge this transformative potential and then seek ways we
might use our legal heritage as a generative force.
The precise contours of such an inquiry are beyond the scope of
this Essay. However, there are many policy questions that might
spring from a recognition of the transformative potential of law. For
example, although a truth and reconciliation commission proceeding
is surely not ever going to be a run-of-the-mill legal event, we may
see, even in day-to-day legal functioning, that our choice of legal rules
and procedures may either encourage or discourage parties to engage
in constructive discourse or become reintegrated members of the
community. Thus, one international restorative justice movement has
experimented with forms of mediation between victims and
perpetrators as an alternative to incarceration of low-level offenders
or juveniles. 201 Similarly, one could imagine ways in which permitting
both victim and perpetrator to meet as part of a plea bargain might
benefit both parties. 202 Perhaps an apology might be made part of the
201. See generally, e.g., TED WACHTEL, REAL JUSTICE (1998); see also generally, e.g.,
MARC UMBREIT, VICrIM MEETS OFFENDER:

THE IMPACr OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

AND MEDIATION (1994).

202. Some advocates of restorative justice practices have pursued this idea by
advocating the use of "circle sentencing" sessions. Circle sentencing is a mediation
practice in which offenders, victims, their advocates, and affected community members sit
in a circle and discuss the impact of the crime. Speakers talk about the concerns of the
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agreement, 2 3 or the victim might be given some say in sentencing.
Or, as with the TRC proceedings, victims might perhaps be given a

greater voice in both criminal and civil legal proceedings. We might
ask whether alternative

criminal

sanctions, such

as shaming,

ultimately foster greater community identification and membership
than does a term of incarceration. 204

We might decide that

community service is a better punishment than prison, or we might
choose instead some symbolic act of punishment that affirms the
order of the community without specifically punishing the individual
at all. 20 5 Alternatively, we might want lay members of the community
to play a greater role in legal proceedings, whether that means

victim, the offender's efforts at rehabilitation, the effect on public safety, the support
resources available to both victim and offender, and other topics related to the crime and
its psychological aftermath. At the end of the session, the members of the circle often
develop a rehabilitative plan for the offender and a series of steps to help the victim and
the community to heal. For further discussion of circle sentencing, see generally Gordon
Bazemore, The "Community" in Community Justice: Issues, Themes, and Questionsfor
the New Neighborhood Sanctioning Models, in COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING
FIELD (David R. Karp ed., 1998).
203. In victim-offender reconciliation programs-programs in which victims confront
offenders in the presence of a third-party mediator-victims, offenders, and community
members identified apology as an especially ameliorative element of the mediation. See
UMBREIT, supra note 201, at 15; see also Rose Ruddick, A Court-Referred Scheme. in
MEDIATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: VICTIMS, OFFENDERS, AND COMMUNITY (Martin
Wright & Burt Galaway eds., 1989) (noting that an apology is an important element of the
reparation scheme in victim-offender mediation practices in Great Britain); June Veevers,
Pre-Court Diversion for Juvenile Offenders, in MEDIATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
VICTIMS, OFFENDERS, AND COMMUNITY (Martin Wright & Burt Galaway eds., 1989)
(asserting that apologies play a key role in mediation involving juvenile offenders). For
further discussion of the role of apology in law, see generally Elizabeth Latif, Note,
Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 289 (2001); Deborah Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1165 (1997).
204. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 591, 630-52 (1996) (discussing the "rediscovery of shame" as a means to enrich "our
punitive vocabulary"). According to Kahan,
Shaming penalties-from bumper stickers for drunk drivers, to publicity for
toxic waste dumpers, to signs or distinctive clothing for sex offenders-are on
the rise in American law. Like imprisonment, these punishments convey
condemnation in dramatic and unequivocal terms. They can thus be expected to
'inspire the public with sentiments of aversion' toward criminality through their
effect on the forces of social influence.
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning,and Deterrence,83 VA. L. REV. 349, 38485 (1997) (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., The Athlone Press 1970)
(1780)).
205. See generally Berman, Forfeiture,supra note 13, at 41-43 (suggesting that forfeiture
proceedings could fulfill such a symbolic function).
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granting jurors the power to ask questions, 20 6 relaxing the rules of
evidence to include more narratives, 20 7 or requiring that members of

the community at large be part of all alternative dispute resolution
proceedings.

208

Further, if we take seriously the idea that legal language and
procedures can foster community dialogue, there are still more policy
questions we may wish to consider. For example, could we harness
the rhetorical power and multivocal framework of a legal trial to
debate policy issues that fall outside the traditional "case or
controversy" requirement? Quasi-legal bodies might be established
that could serve as an effective locus for community debate about
206. Several scholars have argued that jurors should be permitted to participate more
actively in the trial by taking notes and submitting questions for witnesses. See, e.g., Philip
G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277 (1999); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury
Decisionmaking,in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 341, 358-60 (Robert
E. Litan ed., 1993); H. Lee Sarokin & G. Thomas Munsterman, Recent Innovationsin Civil
Jury Procedures,in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 378, 386-88 (Robert
E. Litan ed., 1993); Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury,
ComparativeAnalysis and Proposalsfor Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 451 (1997). These
arguments have focused primarily on concerns about reducing juror error or bias, not on
the possible intrinsic benefits of greater juror participation. Nevertheless, empirical
evidence indicates that, at the very least, permitting jurors to ask questions would increase
the satisfaction of the jurors themselves with the trial process. In one study, 3,800
individuals were asked their opinion concerning the ways in which the trial process could
be reformed. The most frequent reform suggestion was to allow jurors to ask questions to
the parties with court approval. See Franklin D. Strier, Through the Jurors' Eyes, 74
A.B.A. J. 78, 80 (1988). In another study, 80% of jurors questioned said they would have
liked to have been able to question witnesses, and 49.5% still had questions they wanted
answered at the end of the case. See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 310
(1988). In 1995, Arizona became the first state to make juror questions a formal part of
the trial process. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 39(p), 39(b)(10).
207. For example, critical race theorists, feminists, and others have advocated relaxing
the rules of evidence to encourage narrative testimony. See, e.g., Jacqueline St. Joan, Law
and Literature: Sex, Sense, and Sensibility: Trespassing into the Culture of Domestic
Abuse, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 266 (1997) (arguing that "rules of evidence and the
interrogatory format of the trial process suppress the female voice," and suggesting that a
remedy to the problem lies in "broadening the scope of judicial inquiry at trial and
loosening the restrictions on narrative-style testimony"); see also generally Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); Richard Delgado,
Storytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,87 MICH. L. REV. 2411
(1989); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987);
Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded,
Equal Protection, and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111
(1987). Many other sources are collected in Barbara J. Flagg, The Algebra of Pluralism:
Subjective Experienceas a ConstitutionalVariable,47 VAND. L. REV. 273 (1994).
208. See, e.g., Paul McCold, Restorative Justice and the Role of Community, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson
eds., 1996).
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contested social issues. 20 9 Even within the traditional trial structure,
we might ask: Do the rules of procedure and rules of evidence ensure
the most effective expression of the various narratives at play in the
trial? 210 Does the heightened role of lawyers inhibit the expression of
nonprofessional or subversive narratives? 211 Will trials or judicial
opinions be better able to adjudicate disputes among differing
narratives if the juries and judges that author those decisions
represent diverse cultural backgrounds? 212
Will the increased
dissemination of trials on television and the simultaneous increase in
public awareness and debate enhance the ability of court proceedings
to adjudicate national social issues? Or conversely, will televising
legal proceedings remove the aura of mystery and formality necessary
213
to preserve law's ritual functions?
209. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 17 (discussing the trial of the Vietnam War convened
by Bertrand Russel and Jean-Paul Sartre).
210. See, e.g., EDGAR LUSTGARTEN, THE MURDER AND THE TRIAL 3-4 (1958)

(arguing that failure of the discourse of trials to understand and account for human
psychology led to an unjust conviction); William Finnegan, Doubt, THE NEW YORKER,
Jan. 31, 1994, at 48 (expressing frustration that jurors may make incorrect judgments
because rules of evidence preclude them from hearing the full story).
211. See, e.g., John Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263, 282-83 (1978) (discussing forms of discourse prevalent in the "old Bailey" from
the 1670s to the mid-1730s that were later silenced as a result of the increased role of
lawyers at trial).
212. If so, then the recognition that legal proceedings construct narratives provides an
additional justification for the Supreme Court's limitations on the use of peremptory
challenges based on race and gender. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
(forbidding prosecutors from challenging jurors solely on the basis of race); J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson to peremptory challenges based on
gender). The discussion of this issue has generally been framed in terms of the rights
either of defendants or of the excluded jurors themselves. Id. at 128 ("[P]otential jurors,
as well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures that are free
from state-sponsored group stereotypes."); Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86 ("[D]efendant does
have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory patterns."). The role of trials in constructing cultural narratives suggests,
however, that a more diverse jury panel is also necessary so that the resulting narrative is
the product of a diverse group of authors. For example, if the jury in the first trial of the
police officers accused of beating Rodney King had been more racially integrated, it is
possible that an identical verdict might have met with less community resistance. Cf. Tony
Mauro, L.A. Residents Strongly Condemn Verdict, REUTERS NEWS SERV., May 6, 1992
(reporting telephone poll indicating that almost 70% of Los Angeles residents believed
that predominantly white jury was biased in favor of police officer defendants).
213. Certainly, the practice of having judges sit higher than the other participants while
wearing wigs or robes, as well as the maintenance of painstaking decorum within the
courtroom, demonstrate that courts depend at least in part upon the power of theater to
fulfill their social role. See Milner S. Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection
on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REV. 8t, 83 (1975) (suggesting that
"the design and appointment of the courtroom, enhanced by costuming and ceremony, do
create a dramatic aura which has even been described in hyperbolic religious terms").
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Underlying this entire discussion is the belief that, instead of
bemoaning our legalistic culture, we should instead recognize the
potential cultural benefits of law and then take into consideration the
ways in which law might perform its cultural functions more
effectively.214 There are at least two reasons to pursue this avenue of
inquiry. First, it seems to me that, for better or worse, we Americans
are stuck with law as part of our birthright and heritage, and we are
howling in the wilderness if we try to alter that constitutive aspect of
the national psyche. Thus, it makes more sense to see law in all of its
many aspects (including its cultural benefits) rather than insisting that
its pervasive presence be curtailed. Second, we may discover, to our
surprise, that there are distinct advantages to using law to resolve
community dilemmas and that our legal heritage may actually be part
of our strength as a people and not just our Achilles heel. Indeed,
there may even be characteristics of legal discourse that are useful in
building and maintaining a civil society.
Although I provide some preliminary thoughts here, it should be
clear that I am not offering a systematic account of how law always or
often functions, nor am I advancing detailed policy prescriptions
about how our legal institutions might be altered to take advantage of
these cultural roles. Rather, I wish only to offer some alternative
ways of conceptualizing law's cultural impact, and to stimulate
creative thinking about law's potential. Such creative thinking may
ultimately help us to develop an answer to those critics who argue
that law is impoverishing community discourse and values. Finally, I
realize, of course, that my vision of law as a potentially transformative
cultural practice is an idealistic one. And of course, legal proceedings
in the everyday world often fail to live up to this ideal. Nevertheless,
I think it is essential for us to look at law, not as it exists in any
particular place and time, but "as a collective activity of mind and
spirit, which has the possibility of goodness, of value, even of
Sociologist Harold Garfinkel has also recognized the theatrical nature of trials, arguing
that trials function as "status degradation rituals" that draw on the moral indignation of
the community. See Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies,
61 AM. J. Soc. 420, 421 (1956) ("Moral indignation serves to effect the ritual destruction
of the person denounced. Unlike shame, which does not bind persons together, moral
indignation may reinforce group solidarity.... [A] degradation ceremony must be counted

as a secular form of communion.").
214. This suggestion does not necessarily mean that, just because a particular legal rule
has a symbolic value, that rule should automatically be adopted. There may be
countervailing policy concerns strong enough to outweigh any possible meaning-producing
role. Nevertheless, the crucial point is that the symbolic element should at least be
factored into the calculus.
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greatness. 2 1 5 My aim is similar to that expressed by James Boyd
White:
[I]t is with the possibility, not the often lamentable current
conditions, that I am concerned. Perhaps I am answering a voice,
in myself or in the culture, that says that there is no such possibility;
that law is only the exercise of power by one person or group over
another, or only a branch of bureaucracy, or only money-making,
or only instrumental; that it has no real and independent value for
the person or the community. Thus I ask whether we can imagine
law as an activity that in its ideal form, at least on occasions, has
true intellectual, imaginative, ethical, and political worth. If we
can, this would give us both something to aim for and a more
workable and trustworthy ground for the criticism of what we see
2 16
around us.
In the end, rather than quibbling over whether or not law always
lives up to its highest aspirations, we should instead try to celebrate
those aspirations on their own terms and the potential they embody.
After all, if law is a constitutive part of who we are as Americans,
then it is our obligation as legal thinkers to develop ways of
conceptualizing law and using legal discourse as a productive societal
force. Law is, in some ways, our nation's civic religion, and in the face
of increasing attacks on our faith, it is high time that we considered
seriously the transformative potential such faith might hold.

215. Milner S. Ball & James Boyd White, A Conversation Between Milner Ball and
James Boyd White, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 465, 468 (1996).
216. Id.

